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INTRODUCTION
Although the law of trademarks and unfair competition at one time con-
cerned itself only with false designations of origin that were likely to confuse
consumers about the origin of goods or services, with the emergence of the
dilution doctrine during the twentieth century individual states-and ultimately
Congress-began offering the owners of particularly strong marks the opportu-
nity to prevent others from using these marks even in ways which were
unlikely to lead to consumer confusion. In so doing, the law began to treat
trademarks as property in themselves-the product of a trademark owner's
investment in good will-rather than merely as signals enabling consumers to
determine who was accountable for the goods or services in connection with
which the trademark appeared. Dilution law protects the owner of a strong
trademark against unauthorized uses, even when those uses would not be con-
sidered infringing under traditional confusion-based trademark doctrine
because a dilutive use does not confuse consumers about the origin of goods or
services. Thus, while "[h]istorically, the Lanham Act has attempted to balance
the two competing goals of protecting consumers and protecting a trademark
owner's investment,"' dilution law, in contrast, is concerned only with the lat-
ter.2 Although the necessity of extending trademark protection to nonconfusing
uses remains doubtful, it appears that dilution laws are here to stay. The major-
ity of states now recognize the dilution doctrine, and it was incorporated in
federal trademark law in 1995, when Congress enacted the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act ("FTDA") as an amendment to the Lanham Act.
This Article explores some emerging problems in dilution law and their
treatment under state and federal dilution laws, respectively. An examination
of these problems reveals that their resolution under state laws is often quite
different from their resolution under the FTDA. These problems are serious,
and the divergence in approach between state laws and the federal statute gives
rise to uncertainty and nonuniformity regarding the scope of dilution laws. In
* William S. Boyd Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada Las Vegas. This Article is based on the inaugural William S. Boyd Lecture,
presented by the author on February 24, 2006.
' Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 170 (3d
Cir. 2000). The Lanham Act, enacted in 1946, is the federal statutory scheme which protects
both federally registered and common law trademarks against infringing uses. The Lanham
Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000).
2 Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 212 F.3d at 170.
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various contexts, this uncertainty and nonuniformity has a chilling effect on
both competition and free expression, and threatens to erode the public domain
by giving certain trademark owners the opportunity to obtain the near-
equivalent of copyright or design patent protection without being subject to the
limitations of those statutory regimes.
Proposed amendments to the FTDA-the federal antidilution statute-
would address some of these problems at the federal level, but would leave
state dilution laws untouched. While it is certainly desirable to fine-tune the
federal statute in order to strike the proper balance between the rights of trade-
mark owners and the right of the public to compete and to engage in free
expression, this fine-tuning will be for naught if trademark owners can avoid
the limitations of the federal antidilution statute by bringing suit under a
"friendlier" state statute.
Because of the risks posed by these uncertainties, this Article suggests that
it is no longer appropriate to have dual state and federal regimes of dilution
law. Rather, the FTDA should preempt all state laws which protect registered
or common law trademarks in the absence of a likelihood of confusion. The
FTDA already bars state dilution claims against marks that have been federally
registered on the Principal Register of the Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO");3 this Article proposes extending this preemptive effect to unregis-
tered (i.e., common law) marks as well.
Federal preemption of state antidilution laws will give trademark owners
and potential defendants greater certainty as to the scope of their respective
rights. Because dilution protection is designed to protect marks that are partic-
ularly renowned, such marks should enjoy uniform nationwide protection rather
than strong protection in one state and weaker protection in another. In addi-
tion, because the theory behind dilution law-including the very nature of the
injury which dilution law is intended to remedy-remains somewhat nebulous,
it will be helpful to develop a single, consistent body of law to define the harm
and the nature of the proof required to establish that harm. Without such cer-
tainty, competitors will have difficulty determining the range of activities
which are proscribed.
Unlike trademark claims based on the likelihood of confusion, state
antidilution laws have been applied inconsistently even though their wording
tends to be similar. Particular areas of inconsistency include the types of trade-
marks that are protected, the nature of the proof necessary to establish a right to
injunctive relief, and the scope of First Amendment protection available to
defendants. These inconsistencies are of particular concern where the activities
alleged to be dilutive involve expressive speech rather than purely commercial
activity. While state-by-state experimentation can be useful in some areas of
the law, the scope of free expression should not vary by geography. Yet courts
and state legislatures have failed to imbue state antidilution statutes with the
certainty of scope which the First Amendment requires. Because the FTDA
does not fully preempt state antidilution laws, the enactment of this federal
dilution remedy has done little to eliminate these inconsistencies. Yet national
uniformity seems particularly important in dilution law, because dilution law
' 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3).
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expands trademark owners' rights in a manner that often conflicts with First
Amendment concerns, a conflict which should be resolved consistently in every
state in order to avoid the chilling effects that arise from uncertain and incon-
sistent First Amendment protection.
Because the courts seem unable to give potential defendants any degree of
certainty as to which activities are immune from dilution liability under state
antidilution laws, the best way to resolve these problems is to clarify the scope
of the FTDA, ensure that it provides sufficient protection for expressive speech,
and give the FTDA broader preemptive effect over state antidilution laws.
I. ORIGINS OF DILUTION LAW
A. History
Antidilution laws developed from a perceived need to protect especially
strong trademarks from unauthorized uses that attempted to "free-ride" on the
reputational value of the mark, but which were not actionable under traditional
infringement doctrine because they involved noncompeting goods and/or did
not give rise to a likelihood of confusion. It has been said that "[t]he concept of
trademark dilution originated in England when a British court protected the
trademark 'Kodak' from being used on bicycles."4
Unlike traditional trademark and unfair competition law, the dilution doc-
trine is not based on common law. Rather, it is a creature of statute that owes
its origin largely to an influential 1927 law review article by Frank Schechter,
recommending the expansion of unfair competition doctrine beyond the com-
mon law tradition of protecting against consumer deception or confusion.
Schechter argued that unfair competition law should serve the broader goal of
preserving the "uniqueness of a trademark" by protecting the trademark owner
against "the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon
the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods."5
The first antidilution statute was enacted by Massachusetts in 1947.6
Today, however, the majority of states have enacted antidilution legislation.7 A
few states recognize dilution claims at common law,8 while several have
declined to recognize dilution claims at all.9
In 1995, Congress enacted the FTDA as an amendment to the Lanham
Act.' In creating federal antidilution legislation, Congress recognized that
truly famous marks are typically limited to those used on a nationwide scale;
4 L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing Walter
J. Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution and Anti-Dilution Statutes, 44 CALIF. L.
REV. 439 (1956)).
1 Frank Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 825
(1927).
6 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I 10B, § 12 (West 2005).
7 These include Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington.
I These include Maryland, New Jersey, and Ohio.
9 These include Arizona and Nevada.
'o 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
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because only half the states had enacted antidilution legislation at that time,
Congress believed that nationwide protection could be afforded only through
federal legislation."' A major goal of the FTDA, therefore, was "to bring uni-
formity and consistency to the protection of famous marks." 12 However,
because Congress chose not to give the FTDA preemptive effect, that goal has
not been realized.
B. A Solution in Search of a Problem?
The perceived need for dilution protection apparently arose from the
inability of trademark owners to protect their marks against noncompeting uses.
However, the scope of trademark infringement doctrine has broadened consid-
erably over the years, and no longer requires goods to be directly competing in
order to find infringement. In its modem formulation, the likelihood-of-confu-
sion doctrine-which underlies protection of both registered and common law
marks against infringement-might well have protected the owner of the
Kodak mark against unauthorized use of its mark on bicycles.
The scope of traditional trademark infringement doctrine is much greater
today than it was at the start of the twentieth century, when scholar Frank
Schechter proposed that trademark protection should be expanded to include
uses on non-competing goods, on the ground "that the preservation of the uni-
queness of a trademark should constitute the only rational basis for its protec-
tion."'13 One example Schechter used was a German case finding trademark
infringement where a defendant had used the plaintiffs mouthwash trademark
"Odol" on steel products; the German court held that "an article designated
with the name 'Odol' leads the public to assume that it is of good quality."' 4
At the time of Schechter's article, actionable infringement was understood
to arise when the defendant's use of a mark similar to the plaintiff's was likely
to confuse consumers as to the source of the defendant's goods or services, but
courts were reluctant to recognize trademark infringement where dissimilar
goods were involved. 5
Today, however, infringement may be found even if consumers do not
believe the plaintiff was the actual source of the defendant's goods or ser-
vices-it is enough that consumers believe that the plaintiff endorsed, spon-
sored, or approved of them. Thus, confusion-based infringement can be found
even if the parties' goods or services are dissimilar and even noncompeting.
Today, for example, under sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act-the
two provisions which codify the traditional likelihood-of-confusion analysis,
for federally registered and common law marks, respectively-if the use of the
'' H.R. REP No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, cited in
Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157 (3d Cir.
2000).
12 H.R. REP No. 104-374, at 3.
13 Schechter, supra note 5, at 831.
14 Id. at 831-32.
15 Id. at 825; Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 212 F.3d at 170; see, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v.
Nehi Corp., 25 A.2d 364 (Del. Ch. 1942) ("Any unfair conduct, the natural and probable
result of which is to permit the goods of one person, of the same kind, to be passed off for
those of another, is usually unfair competition, in some form, and in a proper case will be
enjoined.") (emphasis added).
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Odol trademark on steel products led the public to assume that the steel prod-
ucts were subject to the same quality standards as Odol mouthwash, this would
be actionable under the likelihood of confusion standard. A separate dilution
claim would be unnecessary, because a consumer who made this assumption
about the quality of Odol steel products based on the quality of Odol
mouthwash could have leapt to this conclusion only because the consumer
believed that production of the steel products and production of the mouthwash
were controlled by the same company-that is, that the steel products were
sponsored, endorsed, or approved by the maker of the mouthwash.
Judge Learned Hand described this evolution in the common law likeli-
hood-of-confusion analysis as early as 1928, in Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson:
The law of unfair trade comes down very nearly to this-as judges have repeated
again and again-that one merchant shall not divert customers from another by rep-
resenting what he sells as emanating from the second. This has been, and perhaps
even more now is, the whole Law and the Prophets on the subject, though it assumes
many guises. Therefore it was at first a debatable point whether a merchant's good
will, indicated by his mark, could extend beyond such goods as he sold. How could
he lose bargains which he had no means to fill? What harm did it do a chewing gum
maker to have an ironmonger use his trade-mark? The law often ignores the nicer
sensibilities.
However, it has of recent years been recognized that a merchant may have a suffi-
cient economic interest in the use of his mark outside the field of his own exploita-
tion to justify interposition by a court. His mark is his authentic seal; by it he
vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries his name for good or ill. If another
uses it, he borrows the owner's reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his
own control. This is an injury, even though the borrower does not tarnish it, or divert
any sales by its use; for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and
creator, and another can use it only as a mask. And so it has come to be recognized
that, unless the borrower's use is so foreign to the owner's as to insure against any
identification of the two, it is unlawful.
16
A few years later, Judge Hand confirmed that "a trade-mark protects the
owner against not only its use upon the articles to which he has applied it, but
upon such other goods as might naturally be supposed to come from him."' 7
Following this rule, courts found viable trademark claims where the goods of
the parties were as diverse as pens and pencils versus razor blades,' 8 magazines
versus girdles,' 9 and radios, electric ranges, and refrigerators versus sewing
machines and vacuum cleaners,20 although some of these decisions met with
occasional resistance from judges who did not yet embrace the concept of
infringement by dissimilar goods.2 1 Judge Hand himself recognized that there
were limits to this broadened view of confusion-based infringement: "It would
16 26 F.2d 972, 973-974 (2d Cir. 1928).
17 L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d 272, 273 (2d Cir. 1934).
18 Id.
19 Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 972 (2d Cir. 1948).
20 Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc., 203 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1953), overruled on other grounds,
Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1965).
21 See, e.g., Rohrlich, 167 F.2d at 975-82 & n.9. (Frank, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that
magazines and girdles are as different as steam shovels and lipstick, or cars and candy).
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be hard, for example, for the seller of a steam shovel to find ground for com-
plaint in the use of his trade-mark on a lipstick."2
The Second Circuit created a formal methodology for applying traditional
trademark infringement analysis to non-competing goods in 1961, in the case of
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp. ,23 where the court listed a variety
of factors that should be considered in determining whether confusion was
likely to arise from a defendant's use of a similar trademark:
Where the products are different, the prior owner's chance of success is a function of
many variables: the strength of his mark, the degree of similarity between the two
marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge
the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its
own mark, the quality of defendant's product, and the sophistication of the buyers.
Even this extensive catalogue does not exhaust the possibilities-the court may have
to take still other variables into account.
24
Since then, every state and federal court has adopted some variation on the
Polaroid factors for assessing the likelihood of confusion.
What is clear from modem trademark cases is that, depending on the
strength of the senior mark, the similarities between the senior and junior
marks, and the other Polaroid factors, even products as diverse as lipstick and
steam shovels may support a traditional likelihood-of-confusion claim. Imag-
ine-using a variation of Judge Hand's steam shovel and lipstick example-
that the John Deere name and logo were to appear, unaltered, on a line of
lipsticks.2 5 Although most people would find this to be quite funny, and the
lipsticks might not be terribly successful, it would not be unreasonable today
for people to believe that, in fact, the tractor maker had made an ill-advised
foray into the field of cosmetics. (And, of course, there is always the possibil-
ity that the juxtaposition would be viewed as so whimsical that the lipstick
would succeed, at least briefly, as a novelty item).
The broadened scope of confusion-based trademark infringement is most
clearly reflected in section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,26 which provides a federal
cause of action for infringement of an unregistered (i.e., common law) trade-
mark, as well as infringement of a registered mark on goods for which it is not
registered. As originally enacted in 1946, section 43(a) provided a remedy only
for a "false designation of origin."2 7 However, courts began to give this lan-
guage a broad interpretation, extending it to situations in which consumers
were likely to believe that the trademark owner approved or sponsored the
defendant's goods or services, even if they did not believe that the trademark
owner actually produced those goods or services.25 In the infamous Dallas
22 L.E. Waterman Co., 72 F.2d at 273.
23 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
24 Id. at 495 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, §§ 729, 730, 731).
25 True, John Deere does not make steam shovels, but neither does anyone else these days.
Agricultural equipment seems like a respectable analogue.
26 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
27 60 Stat. 441 (1946).
28 See, e.g., Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971);
Boston Prof I Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F.
Supp. 1183, 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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Cowboys Cheerleaders case, for example, the Second Circuit upheld a prelimi-
nary injunction against an adult film whose lead character wore what appeared
to be the official uniform of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders. The court noted
that the plaintiff's section 43(a) claim could succeed if the plaintiff could estab-
lish "that the public may associate it with defendants' movie and be confused
into believing that plaintiff sponsored the movie, provided some of the actors,
licensed defendants to use the uniform, or was in some other way connected
with the production. 29
This broad reading of section 43(a) mirrored the increasingly liberal
approach of courts interpreting the common law of unfair competition. For
example, in 1962 the Fifth Circuit applied Florida's common law in holding
that the defendant's slogan, "Where there's life, there's bugs" infringed plain-
tiff's common law rights in its slogan "Where there's life, there's Bud."'30 The
plaintiffs beer clearly did not compete with the defendant's insecticide-laden
floor wax. Yet the district court concluded that the defendant's advertising
could lead consumers to believe that the products or their producers were some-
how affiliated:
The court finds from listening to the tapes, and from watching the film strips, that
defendant's use of the slogan was confusingly similar to plaintiff s. This is not to say
that the tunes or the words in the advertising were exactly the same, but from the
rhythm, meter and the pictures which appeared at the time that the slogan was used,
when taken as a whole, created the impression that defendant's advertising had some
connection with the plaintiff or plaintiff's product. Some of defendant's film strips
show drinking glasses being filled, people dancing, and a simultaneous use of the
slogan 'Where there's life . . . there's Bugs'. These films follow a format which
plaintiff had employed for some four years. The court finds that the advertising of
defendant is deceptively similar, so as to confuse the advertising of plaintiff and
defendant.
The court also finds that the value and effectiveness of plaintiff's prior advertising is
impaired to some extent by the deceptively similar phraseology and treatment
employed by defendant in its advertising. Unless enjoined, there is sufficient likeli-
hood [of] damage to plaintiff ....
The goods of plaintiff and the goods of defendant are not competitive, but the goods
of plaintiff and defendant are sold at the same retail outlets and the association of
bugs with Bud or Budweiser is sufficient to merit the apprehension that the ill repute
of one type of goods is likely to be visited upon the other.
3 1
In the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Congress ratified these judi-
cial interpretations by broadening the language of section 43(a) to encompass
the use of any "device" which "is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mis-
take, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such per-
son with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person."'32 Today,
under both state and federal law, the likelihood-of-confusion analysis routinely
protects against the unauthorized use of a mark "on any product or service
29 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir.
1979). This case is discussed infra at notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
30 Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433, 435 (5th Cir. 1962).
31 Id.
32 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
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which would reasonably be thought by the buying public to come from the
same source, or thought to be affiliated with, connected with, or sponsored by,
the trademark owner.
' 33
Thus, under today's approach to the likelihood of confusion analysis, the
need for antidilution laws is not as great as it was perceived to be when Frank
Schechter wrote his historic article. As consumers become more sophisticated
about trademark law in general, and about such phenomena as product place-
ment in motion pictures and television programming specifically, a likelihood
of confusion is more likely to be found even where the products in question are
noncompeting. In situations where confusion is extremely unlikely, however,
dilution doctrine still has an effect on the marketplace. The question is whether
that effect is good for consumers and for the public at large. As discussed
below, the current cacophony of antidilution statutes, and inconsistent interpre-
tations of those statutes, threatens to have a chilling effect on competition and
free expression. Short of repealing these statutes altogether, the best solution is
to enforce uniformity through federal preemption of state antidilution laws.
II. PROBLEMS IN ANTIDILUTION LEGISLATION: SOME THRESHOLD ISSUES
All dilution laws suffer from deficiencies at the most basic threshold
level-defining the injury, defining how the injury is to be proven, identifying
which marks are protected, and determining whether a junior user's mark is
sufficiently similar to be actionable. Although the resolution of these issues is
neither certain nor satisfactory under any of the myriad antidilution statutes that
have been enacted, the federal statute at least offers uniformity in place of the
conflicting resolutions offered by state laws.
A. Defining and Proving the Injury
A fundamental and continuing problem in dilution doctrine is defining the
nature of the harm sought to be prevented. A corollary is the problem of prov-
ing this harm. Even eighty years after the concept of dilution was first pro-
posed, solutions to both these problems remain surprisingly elusive. As the
Second Circuit has observed, "dilution remains a somewhat nebulous
concept."
34
1. Defining the Harm
There have been many attempts to define the harm arising from dilution.
In the words of one scholar:
The gravamen of a dilution complaint is that the continuous use of a mark similar to
plaintiff's works an inexorably adverse effect upon the distinctiveness of the Plain-
tiff's mark, and that, if he is powerless to prevent such use, his mark will lose its
distinctiveness entirely. This injury differs materially from that arising out of the
orthodox confusion * * *. Such confusion leads to immediate injury, while dilution
3 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Pubs., 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24.03, at 24-13 (3d ed.
1992)).
14 Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983).
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is an infection which, if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising
value of the mark.35
Another scholar has stated:
The underlying rationale of the dilution doctrine is that the gradual diminution or
whittling away of the value of a trademark, resulting from use by another, constitutes
an invasion of the senior user's property right and good will in his mark and gives
rise to an independent wrong.
36
Referring to the federal as well as the state antidilution statutes, the Sec-
ond Circuit has observed:
The antidilution statutes rest on a judgment that the "stimulant effect" of a distinctive
and well-known mark is a "powerful selling tool" that deserves legal protection. This
power derives not only from "the merit of the goods upon which [the mark] is used,
but equally [from the mark's] own uniqueness and singularity." Even when an unau-
thorized use of the mark does not cause consumer confusion, it can "reduce[ ] the
public's perception that the mark signifies something unique, singular, or particular."
The junior use thereby diminishes the "selling power that a distinctive mark or name
with favorable associations has engendered for a product in the mind of the consum-
ing public."
37
Each jurisdiction which recognizes the dilution concept faces the problem
of defining the prohibited conduct. However, in most cases, state legislatures
have provided no statutory definitions, leaving this task to the courts.
Antidilution statutes typically recognize two types of dilution: bluffing
and tarnishment. Blurring occurs when another's use of a mark creates "the
possibility that the mark will lose its ability to serve as a unique identifier of the
plaintiffs product," while tarnishment occurs "when a famous mark is improp-
erly associated with an inferior or offensive product or service. '"38 Hypotheti-
cal examples of blurring that were mentioned in the legislative history of the
New York antidilution statute include: "DuPont shoes, Buick aspirin tablets,
Schlitz varnish, Kodak pianos, [and] Bulova gowns."3 9 Congress used similar
examples when it enacted the federal antidilution statute.40 In contrast, a trade-
mark may be "tarnished" when it is "linked to products of shoddy quality, or is
portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context," with the result that "the
public will associate the lack of quality or lack of prestige in the defendant's
goods with the plaintiff's unrelated goods."4 The mark may also be tarnished
if it loses its ability to serve as a "wholesome identifier" of the plaintiffs
product.42
35 RUDOLF CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS 1963 (2d ed.
1950).
36 MCCARTHY, supra note 33, § 24:13.
37 Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
38 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002); Panavision Int'l, L.P.
v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 n.7 (9th Cir. 1998).
39 Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 506 (2d Cir.1996) (citing
1954 N.Y.Legis.Ann. 49-50).
40 "DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin, and KODAK pianos." H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030.
41 Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994).
42 id.
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Although the vast majority of courts find dilution when, and only when,
either blurring or tarnishment occurs, the Second Circuit found dilution in one
case even though it found that neither blurring nor tamishment were likely to
occur, holding that one competitor diluted another's trademark by altering it in
order to poke fun at it.43
The dilution doctrine made national headlines in 2003, when the Supreme
Court considered a federal dilution claim by the owner of the Victoria's Secret
trademark against the proprietor of a Kentucky retail store selling lingerie, as
well as adult novelties and videos, under the name "Victor's Little Secret."
The defendant's original name was "Victor's Secret," but in response to the
threat of litigation the defendant changed it to "Victor's Little Secret," with
"Little" in much smaller lettering located above the rest of the name. 44 Despite
this change, the lower courts found tarnishment, because the defendant's mer-
chandise was perceived as tackier than the plaintiff s. 45 Although the district
court did not specifically address the question of blurring, the court of appeals
held that blurring had also occurred. 46 The court of appeals described the
nature of the harm to Victoria's Secret as follows:
[W]e must ask whether a consumer would link a store called "Victor's Little Secret"
that sold women's lingerie with the more famous Victoria's Secret. We have little
doubt that the average lingerie consumer would make just such an association....
While no consumer is likely to go to the Moseleys' store expecting to find Victoria's
Secret's famed Miracle Bra, consumers who hear the name "Victor's Little Secret"
are likely automatically to think of the more famous store and link it to the Moseleys'
adult-toy, gag gift, and lingerie shop. This, then, is a classic instance of dilution by
tarnishing (associating the Victoria's Secret name with sex toys and lewd coffee
mugs) and by blurring (linking the chain with a single, unauthorized
establishment).47
The FTDA does not separately define blurring and tarnishment, but
defines dilution broadly as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services."48 In fact, in contrast to the state
antidilution statutes, which typically are worded in such a way that they clearly
encompass both blurring and tarnishment, the FTDA is silent on tarnishment.49
However, the proposed Trademark Dilution Revision Act50 (hereinafter
"TDRA") would replace the current federal definition of dilution with separate
definitions of "dilution by blurring" and "dilution by tarnishment," defining
blurring as an "association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade
name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark,"
and defining tarnishment as "association arising from the similarity between a
41 Id. at 44-45. For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 107-21 and accompanying text.
44 V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 467 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd, Moseley
v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
45 Id.
46 Id.; Moseley, 537 U.S. at 425.
47 V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 259 F.3d at 477.
48 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
49 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 431-32 (noting that nothing in the language of the FTDA encom-
passes tarnishment, although the legislative history indicates congressional intent to cover
both tarnishment and blurring).
50 H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2005).
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mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous
mark."'" The amendments would also make clear that a cause of action under
the FTDA may arise either for dilution by blurring or dilution by tamishment.
Notwithstanding these and many other attempts to define dilution, the con-
cept is inherently murkier than the concept of a "likelihood of confusion."
Blurring, in particular, is hard to pin down. Does it refer to weakening of the
senior user's mark? Or to any unauthorized attempt to ride the coattails of that
mark, regardless of whether the mark is weakened as a result?
While tarnishment may be easier to define than blurring, the need for a
doctrine of dilution by tamishment is doubtful. Where a defendant has made or
implied false assertions of fact about the quality of a trademark owner's goods
or services, or about the character, affiliations, or reputation of the trademark
owner, such conduct is already actionable under such well-settled doctrines as
defamation and false advertising, provided that the assertions are at least
remotely credible. Thus, for example, when Amway distributors started a
rumor that Procter & Gamble was affiliated with satan worshippers, no tarnish-
ment claim was needed; P&G brought claims of false advertising and defama-
tion, among others. To the extent that the concept of dilution by tarnishment
reaches conduct that is not actionable under these doctrines-for example,
where the defendant implies no factual assertions or where the assertions are
not credible (as in the case of parodies or irreverent humor)-the utility of the
tarnishment concept may be outweighed by its chilling effect on expressive
speech, which is the subject of Part III of this Article.
2. Problems in proving dilution
In addition to defining the harm caused by dilution, courts also have diffi-
culty establishing a standard of proof-that is, what type and amount of evi-
dence is necessary to establish that dilution has occurred, or is likely to occur.
In delineating a standard of proof for claims of blurring, some courts have
used a multi-factor test that strongly resembles the likelihood-of-confusion
analysis. For example, the Second Circuit has considered the following factors
(known as the "Sweet factors") to determine blurring: distinctiveness of the
senior user's mark, similarity of the marks, similarity of the products, consumer
confusion, likelihood that the senior user will "bridge the gap" by entering the
same field of commerce as the junior user, shared consumers and geographic
limitations, sophistication of consumers, harm to the junior user, and delay by
the senior user.52 This approach has deservedly been criticized for blurring the
distinction between dilution doctrine and the traditional likelihood-of-confusion
analysis.5 3 A few courts have held that a showing of predatory intent is rele-
vant, 54 even though no antidilution statute expressly requires such intent. Even
"1 H.R., sec. 2.
52 E.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217-27 (2d Cir. 1999).
53 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468-69 (7th Cir. 2000);
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d
449, 463-64 (4th Cir. 1999); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 49-50 (1st
Cir. 1998); MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at § 24:94.1.
54 See, e.g., Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 626 (2d Cir. 1983); McDon-
ald's Corp. v. McBagel's, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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within a single jurisdiction, most notably the Second Circuit, courts have
applied inconsistent approaches.5 5
Like the state antidilution statutes, the FTDA provides no guidance what-
soever on the nature or amount of proof necessary to establish dilution. Some
district courts have even used the multi-factor confusion analysis to assess blur-
ring under the FTDA.
5 6
3. Actual Dilution versus Likelihood of Dilution
Also problematic is the timing or certainty of the harm. Does a dilution
claim arise when a plaintiff can establish that the defendant's conduct is likely
to cause dilution? Or must the plaintiff wait until the defendant's conduct has
actually caused dilution to occur? Because injunctive relief is typically the
only remedy permitted under antidilution statutes, many of those statutes
explicitly permit plaintiffs to obtain a remedy before dilution actually occurs.
This approach is consistent with traditional confusion-based infringement,
which favors injunctive relief as soon as a likelihood of confusion can be estab-
lished. The rationale for this approach under confusion-based doctrine is that
the law should encourage prevention of consumer confusion, since such confu-
sion harms consumers and may also cause a trademark owner to lose sales to
the infringer.
Typically, under state antidilution statutes, a trademark owner need only
establish that dilution is likely to occur if the defendant's conduct is allowed to
continue.57 In practice, moreover, courts often grant preliminary injunctive
relief if the plaintiffs mark is sufficiently distinctive and/or famous, and the
defendant's mark is similar to the plaintiff's, without any further evidence that
the plaintiff is likely to be injured by the similarity. 58
Unlike most state statutes, the FTDA in its current form appears to provide
a remedy only after dilution has already taken place, and offers no guidance on
the nature of the proof that is required to establish that such injury has
occurred. This problem was identified by the Supreme Court in Moseley v. V
Secret Catalogue, Inc. 59-the now-famous "Victoria's Secret" case-where
the Court interpreted the FTDA as requiring proof of actual dilution, rather than
a mere likelihood of dilution in the future. Unfortunately, the Court was able to
provide little guidance as to how actual dilution might be proved, a point which
has not been lost on the lower federal courts.
60
" See, e.g., Sports Auth. Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 966 (2d Cir. 1996)
(applying a 6-factor test); Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 73 (2d
Cir. 1994) (applying only some of the 6 factors); Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d
39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994) (declining to apply the 6-factor test altogether); Mead Data Cent., Inc.
v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031-32 (2d Cir. 1989) (similar).
56 See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows
Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204, 211-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Wawa Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1629, 1632-33 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 116 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 1997); Clinique Labs., Inc. v.
Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
" See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. L. § 360-1 (McKinney Supp. 2004).
51 See infra notes 129-33, and note 167, with accompanying text.
9 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
6 See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Softbelly's Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 535 (7th Cir. 2003) ("We are not sure
what question could be put to consumers that would elicit a meaningful answer .... "); see
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Congress is now considering a proposal to overrule this part of the Victo-
ria's Secret decision, by amending the FTDA to expressly permit claims based
on the mere likelihood of dilution. However, the proposed amendments pro-
vide courts with limited guidance for assessing this likelihood. In assessing the
likelihood of dilution by blurring, courts are instructed that they "may consider
all relevant factors." The amendments offer the following non-exhaustive list
of factors which may be relevant:
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark.
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark.
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially
exclusive use of the mark.
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark.
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association
with the famous mark.
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous
mark.
6
'
On the question of how to assess the likelihood of dilution by tarnishment,
however, the proposed amendments offer no guidance whatsoever.
B. Which trademarks are protected by dilution law?
There is no single standard for determining which trademarks enjoy pro-
tection against dilution. In some states, any distinctive mark is eligible for
dilution protection.62 In other states, however, it is not enough for the mark
merely to be distinctive enough to serve as a trademark; it must be "highly
distinctive," "strong," or "famous"; in some states, this requirement is
expressly imposed by the antidilution statute,6 3 while in others it results from
judicial interpretations of the statute. 64 In many jurisdictions, there is no clear
standard for assessing whether a trademark possesses the requisite level of
distinctiveness.
The current federal statute is among the most restrictive, limiting dilution
protection to marks that are not only distinctive but famous, without clearly
defining what it means to be "famous. 65 The TDRA attempts to remedy this
also Jonathan Moskin, Victoria's Big Secret: Whither Dilution Under the Federal Dilution
Act?, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 842, 853 (2003); MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at § 24:94.2.
61 H.R. 683, 109th Cong, § 2. (2005).
62 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 647.107 (2003).
63 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.77.010 (2006).
6 See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1999) (requir-
ing "fame" under California statute); Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, 221 F. Supp. 2d 425, 437-
38 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (requiring mark to be "extremely strong" under New York statute),
affd, Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24243 (2d Cir. 2003); Glen Raven
Mills, Inc. v. Ramada Int'l, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 1544, 1554-55 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (requiring a
mark to be "highly distinctive" under Florida statute); but see Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v.
Lund, 648 P.2d 393, 398 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (refusing to impose such a gloss on Oregon
statute), aff'd, 659 P.2d 377 (Or. 1983)).
65 Section 43(c) lists eight non-exhaustive factors that a court may consider in determining
whether a mark is both "distinctive and famous," without distinguishing which factors indi-
cate fame and which indicate mere distinctiveness. Seven of the factors are measures of
degree rather than either/or tests-e.g., "the duration and extent of advertising and publicity
of the mark." 15 U.S.C. § I 125(c)(1)(A)-(H) (2000).
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omission, providing that "a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the
general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the
goods or services of the mark's owner. ' ' 66 This responds in part to confusion
among the courts that have interpreted the FTDA's fame requirement; some
courts have required a mark to be famous among the general body of consum-
ers nationwide,67 while others have held that a mark can be famous for dilution
purposes if it is extremely well known within a particular market niche.68
It was clearly Congress's intent to protect only a narrow class of truly
famous marks under the FTDA.69 Many scholars supported this limitation,
arguing, for example, that "[w]ithout such a requirement, an anti-dilution stat-
ute becomes a rogue law that turns every trademark, no matter how weak, into
an anti-competitive weapon, "70 and that "[tlo save the dilution doctrine from
abuse by plaintiffs whose marks are not famous and distinctive, a large neon
sign should be placed adjacent wherever the doctrine resides, reading: 'The
Dilution Rule: Only Strong Marks Need Apply."'
7 1
Thus, compared with state antidilution statutes, the FTDA provides a
somewhat clearer indication of which marks are protected, and the TDRA
amendments, if enacted, will add some further clarification.
C. Degree of Similarity Required
State antidilution statutes do not specify the degree of similarity required
in order to establish that one mark dilutes another. As a result, courts are
required to make these important determinations on an ad hoc basis, with no
legislative guidance.
The federal statute, read literally, seems to require the marks to be identi-
cal, or nearly so. It permits an injunction against a defendant's commercial use
of "a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become
66 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2(A) (2005). The
amendments add that a court may "consider all relevant factors" in assessing fame, including
a list of factors somewhat shorter than those included in the current version of section 43(c):
"(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark,
whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties. (ii) The amount, volume, and
geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark. (iii) The extent of
actual recognition of the mark." Id.
67 E.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 450 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004); TCPIP Holding
Co. v. Haar Comms., Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 98-99 (2d Cir. 2001); Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v.
Sportsman's Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 497 n.10 (2d Cir. 2000); Thane Int'l, Inc. v. Trek
Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 910 (9th Cir. 2002); Ott v. Target Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1055,
1075 (D.Minn. 2001).
68 E.g., Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 174
(3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1071 (2001); Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper
Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 640-41 (7th Cir. 1999).
69 Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 212 F.3d at 170-171 (3d Cir. 2000) (Barry, J., dissenting);
Trademark Review Commission, Report & Recommendations, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375,
455 (1987); S. REP. No. 100-515 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5604
(emphasis added). Examples of truly famous marks cited in a House Report on the FTDA
included "Buick", "Dupont", and "Kodak". See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), as
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031.
70 MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at § 24:108.
71 Id. at § 24:108; see also 2 GILSON § 5.12[1][b] at 5-260 (referring to class of trademarks
protected by FTDA as "Supermarks").
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famous."72 Yet, despite this language, one court has interpreted the federal
statute as requiring a relatively low degree of similarity.7 3
A requirement of near-identity would be consistent with the legislative
histories of the New York antidilution statute and the FTDA, as well as the
early authorities, such as Professor Schechter, that argued in favor of antidilu-
tion laws by citing such examples as Kodak bicycles, Buick aspirin, Bulova
Gowns, Schlitz varnish, and so forth." None of the examples cited by these
authorities involved humorous or parodic alterations of a senior user's mark.
However, in interpreting the FTDA as well as state antidilution statutes, the
courts have generally not imposed a standard of near-identity.75
The following table lists four examples of protected marks followed by the
marks that were deemed similar enough to dilute them under the FTDA:
TABLE I
Protected Marks Dilutive Marks
The New York Stock Exchange The New York Slot Exchange
Victoria's Secret Victor's Little Secret
Prozac76  Herbrozac
The Sporting News77 The Las Vegas Sporting News
In contrast, "The Greatest Snow on Earth" was not sufficiently similar to
"The Greatest Show on Earth" to support an FTDA claim.78
State antidilution statutes have been applied to equally divergent marks:
72 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
7' Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 693 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
71 See I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 50 (1st Cir. 1998) (adopting the
standard that customers must view the marks as "essentially the same").
75 See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 218 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that
"the marks must be of sufficient similarity so that, in the mind of the consumer, the junior
mark will conjure an association with the senior," but not requiring that marks be completely
identical).
76 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000).
77 Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 168-169
(3d Cir. 2000).
78 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170
F.3d 449, 461-63 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923 (1999).
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TABLE II
Protected Marks Dilutive Marks
The Greatest Show on Earth7 9  The Greatest Used Car Show on
Earth
McDonald's 8°  McBagel's
Toys R Us81  Kids R Us
If "The Greatest Used Car Show on Earth" was similar enough to the
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey mark to cause dilution under the Illinois stat-
ute, but the "Greatest Snow on Earth" was not similar enough under the FTDA,
how can a prospective parodist determine the permissible range of expression?
In the Victoria's Secret case, the Supreme Court did suggest that the
degree of similarity between the marks could be relevant to the dilution analy-
sis. In holding that proof of actual dilution was required, rather than a mere
likelihood of dilution, the Court added:
It may well be, however, that direct evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys
will not be necessary if actual dilution can reliably be proved through circumstantial
evidence-the obvious case is one where the junior and senior marks are identical. 82
Although the Court appears to be saying that identical marks are always
dilutive, it is not clear that the federal dilution statute requires this conclusion.
Even if it does, a better approach, achievable by amendment, might be to spec-
ify that, as a matter of law, the only marks that are dilutive are those that are
identical, or nearly so.
III. FREE ExPREsSION VERSUS COMMERCIAL SPEECH
One of the most problematic differences between state antidilution statutes
and the FTDA is the extent to which they incorporate protections for free
expression. In general, state antidilution statutes provide for no exceptions,
even for noncommercial speech; any such claim of exemption must be affirma-
tively raised by a defendant under the First Amendment. Judicial responses to
such First Amendment arguments, however, have been inconsistent.
In contrast, the FTDA contains an express exemption for the "noncom-
mercial use of a mark." However, the scope of this exception is unclear. In
fact, it is unclear why Congress thought it necessary to include a noncommer-
cial use exception at all, because a dilution action under the FTDA applies only
to a "commercial use in commerce."8 3 One answer, suggested by the Second
" Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet,
855 F.2d 480, 482 (7th Cir. 1988).
80 McDonald's Corp. v. McBagel's, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
81 Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1208 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
82 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003).
83 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 1171 (2003).
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Circuit, is that "noncommercial use" in this context refers to "a use that consists
entirely of noncommercial, or fully constitutionally protected, speech."'84 If
this is correct, then the noncommercial use exception applies to certain types of
speech that are protected by the First Amendment but which fall outside the
more specific FTDA exceptions for comparative advertising and news report-
ing.85 Courts have interpreted this general noncommercial use exception to
include comedy, parody, satire, consumer criticism, editorial commentaries,
and other forms of expression, even when they are sold for money.8 6 It would
therefore appear to encompass any speech that is not purely commercial-that
is, any speech that "does more than propose a commercial transaction. '"87
The success of a dilution claim should depend in part on the level of
expressive content in the allegedly dilutive merchandise. This should be the
case whether the expressive content is protected by an explicit exception, as in
the FTDA, or by general First Amendment principles. However, in practice,
the results under state and federal dilution laws are often inconsistent. Where
the imitative vehicle has very little expressive content, it will generally receive
no protection from otherwise-valid dilution claims, whether those claims are
brought under state or federal law. However, where the merchandise has sig-
nificant expressive content, the results under state and federal dilution laws are
surprisingly divergent, resulting in inconsistent and unpredictable results that
may inhibit free expression, a problem which could be resolved to some degree
if Congress were to give preemptive effect to the FTDA's noncommercial use
exception.
A. Nonexpressive Goods
Where the imitative vehicle is not a traditional expressive work, the use of
a famous mark almost certainly will be treated as dilutive, under both state and
federal dilution laws. Even in these cases, however, the courts do not always
appear to be comfortable with the broad reach of the dilution doctrine, and the
differences between state and federal antidilution laws can lead to divergent
results.
84 Id. at 905; accord, Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 695-98
(N.D. Ohio 2002).
85 Support for this interpretation can be found in the legislative history, which contains
references to "noncommercial expression," "consumer product reviews," "artistic and
expressive speech," and "parody, satire, editorial and other forms of expression that are not a
part of a commercial transaction." Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 905-06 (collecting sources); see,
e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (noting
that section 43(c)(4)(B) encompasses "parody, satire, editorial and other forms of expression
that are not part of a commercial transaction").
86 Ford Motor Co. v. 2600 Enters., 177 F. Supp. 2d 661, 664-65 (E.D. Mich. 2001); Charles
Atlas, Ltd. v. D.C. Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Northland Ins.
Cos. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1122-23 (D. Minn. 2000); World Championship
Wrestling v. Titan Sports, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 118, 122-23 (D. Conn. 1999); Mattel, Inc. v.
MCA Records, CV 97-6791-WMB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310, at *47-50 (C.D. Cal. Feb.
18, 1998); Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1166-67 (C.D.
Cal. 1998); Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Book USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1574 (S.D.
Cal. 1996); Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
87 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002).
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For example, in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.,88 a preliminary injunc-
tion was granted under both the FTDA and the New York antidilution statute,
where the defendant sold crackers that closely resembled Pepperidge Farm's
famous goldfish crackers, the characteristics of which were protected as trade
dress. Although there was virtually no likelihood that consumers would be
confused by the similarity, the similarity alone was enough, in the court's view,
to undermine the distinctive quality of the plaintiff's mark.89 Despite the
authorities indicating that neither competition nor confusion is necessary to a
finding of dilution, the court suggested that the similarity of the products utiliz-
ing the marks (a traditional likelihood-of-confusion factor) contributed to the
likelihood of dilution:
If Pepperidge Farm were seeking to enjoin the use of a fish-shape as the logo for an
automobile, a newspaper, or a line of sports clothes, much less as the mark of a fish
merchant or fish restaurant, it seems questionable whether dilution should be found.
But here the junior user's area of commerce is identical to the senior's. A second
major seller of goldfish-shaped, orange-colored, cheddar-flavored, bite-sized crackers
can hardly fail, in our view, to dilute the distinctiveness in the eyes of the consumers
of the senior mark in a goldfish-shaped, orange-colored, cheddar-flavored, bite-sized
cracker.
90
This part of the court's analysis seems completely at odds with the legisla-
tive histories of both the FTDA and the New York antidilution statute. It is
typical, however, of a great deal of dilution case law (especially in the Second
Circuit)9 where courts have been reluctant to acknowledge a basis for liability
that completely dispenses with the likelihood of confusion analysis.
Consider, next, the tale of Tony the Tiger. In a true cat fight, Kellogg
sued Exxon Mobil, alleging that Exxon's cartoon tiger infringed and diluted
Kellogg's Tony the Tiger.9" Tony was born in Kellogg's marking department
during the 1950s. Exxon began using its own cartoon tiger in the 1960s, but
put the character into hibernation during the 1980s in an effort to appear more
serious about energy conservation. However, in 1989, when the Exxon Valdez
oil spill created a public relations disaster for the company, Exxon woke the
tiger from his nap, and treated him to a bit of a makeover. Exxon's artist
explained at the time: "Today's Tiger is now cast in a more humanitarian role.
He is polite to the elderly, plants trees for ecology and has an overall concern
for the environment." 93 The reinvented tiger was a smash hit, and became a
pervasive presence in Exxon's marketing of its good and services, including its
"Tiger Mart" convenience stores.
This is when Tony the Tiger's claws came out. Kellogg filed suit, alleging
that Exxon's use of its new tiger character to market its convenience store food
items infringed and diluted the venerable Tony, the recognized symbol of Kel-
logg's Frosted Flakes. The dilution claims were brought under both the Ten-
nessee antidilution statute and the FTDA. On the FTDA claim, the court
88 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
89 Id. at 218.
90 Id. at 219 (emphasis added).
9' See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d
Cir. 1989) (interpreting New York statute).
92 Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 790, 793-94 (W.D. Tenn. 2001).
93 Id. at 795.
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required evidence of actual consummated dilution; the court found evidence of
actual blurring, but not tarnishment.94 Under the Tennessee statute, however,
only a likelihood of dilution was required.9 5 The court found a likelihood of
blurring, but reached a split decision on the state tarnishment claim; it rejected
Kellogg's argument that Exxon's tiger was likely to tarnish Tony's image by
linking Tony to environmental degradation, but it acknowledged the possibility
that Tony would be tarnished by being linked to the alcohol and tobacco prod-
ucts sold in the Tiger Mart stores.9 6
In the context of purely commercial goods, even an obvious parody of a
famous mark has generally been treated as dilutive. For example, courts have
issued injunctions in cases involving a diaper bag with green and red bands and
the wording "Gucchi Goo," which poked fun at the well-known Gucci name
and the design mark,97 and the use on a meat sauce of the trademark "A.2" as a
"pun" on the famous "A. 1" steak sauce. 98 Although it would not be accurate to
say that such parodies have no expressive content, the expressive aspect of their
content is relatively minor compared to their commercial aspect. Because lia-
bility for dilution can arise even in the absence of consumer confusion, how-
ever, the fact that a defendant is obviously parodying a plaintiffs mark
generally does not help the defendant to avoid dilution liability, even though
the obviousness of the parody can eliminate liability for traditional infringe-
ment because it eliminates the likelihood of confusion.
In a case of obvious parody, the New York New York Hotel in Las Vegas
was sued for trademark infringement and dilution by the New York Stock
Exchange, because the hotel's casino had the temerity to call its slot machine
area the "New York Slot Exchange."99 The Stock Exchange invoked the famil-
iar trio of theories-likelihood of confusion, dilution by blurring, and dilution
by tarnishment. Two-thirds of the decision in the case favored the casino. The
Second Circuit found no likelihood-of-confusion, because, in its own words, a
visitor to the casino "could not miss the elaborate parody" in the name.1 00 The
trademark itself was so famous, and the parody so obvious, that it was "highly
unlikely that anyone would misunderstand the Casino's attempt at a humorous
theme because it actually 'depends on a lack of confusion to make its
point.' ,101
However, the Stock Exchange also raised dilution claims under New
York's antidilution statute, which provides for injunctive relief against activi-
ties which are merely likely to cause blurring or tarnishment of the plaintiffs
mark. No actual blurring or tamishment need be demonstrated.'O2
94 id. at 807-08.
95 Id. at 808.
96 Id. at 810-11.
97 Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838, 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
98 Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Kaye, 760 F. Supp. 25, 29 (D. Conn. 1991).
99 New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v. New York, New York Hotel, LLC., 293 F.3d 550, 552
(2d Cir. 2002).
100 Id. at 555.
101 Id. at 556 (quoting Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 503
(2d Cir. 1996)).
102 Id. at 558.
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The court reached the same conclusion on the likelihood of blurring that it
reached on the likelihood of confusion: "The humor or parody in the Casino's
use of the modified NYSE marks depends upon the fact that the Casino is not
claiming to be associated with NYSE, albeit the Casino seeks to emphasize that
it too offers possible profits and certain risks. There is therefore no diminution
of the capacity of NYSE's marks to serve as a unique identifier of its products
and services."1 °3
However, the court reached a different conclusion on the likelihood of
tarnishment, which occurs, according to the court, when a trademark is "linked
to products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory
context," with the result that "the public will associate the lack of quality or
lack of prestige in the defendant's goods with the plaintiffs unrelated
goods."'" In the court's view, the plaintiffs tarnishment claim was suffi-
ciently strong to require a trial on the merits:
[T]he Casino's use of the modified NYSE marks might well be viewed by a trier of
fact at the very least as drawing an analogy, albeit humorous, between its business
and that of NYSE. NYSE in turn wants to preserve a reputation for listing companies
that adhere to its rules for accounting, disclosure, and management and are therefore
safer investments than are companies that need not abide by such rules. NYSE
would also like to preserve a reputation for integrity and transparency in the trading
conducted on its floor. A reasonable trier of fact might therefore find that the
Casino's humorous analogy to its activities-deemed by many to involve odds
stacked heavily in favor of the house-would injure NYSE's reputation. As we have
stated before, 'tarnishment is not limited to seamy conduct.' 105
In Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc.,106 the Second Circuit went one
step further, holding that New York's antidilution statute applied to conduct
that qualified as neither tarnishment nor blurring. Deere raised the question
whether, under New York law, "the use of an altered version of a distinctive
trademark to identify a competitor's product and achieve a humorous effect can
constitute trademark dilution."'
10 7
Ordinarily, comparative advertising does not give rise to liability for dilu-
tion, even when it involves puffery.'0 8 However, while the FTDA contains a
specific exception for comparative advertising (separate from the exception for
noncommercial uses),' 0 9 most state antidilution statutes do not.
Under the traditional likelihood-of-confusion analysis, the use of a com-
petitor's trademark in comparative advertising is considered non-infringing,
provided that the advertising does not cause confusion about the origin of
goods or services. Rather, the audience understands that one company is iden-
tifying another company's competing products by their trademark, and is
103 Id.
1o1 Id. (citing Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 966 (2d Cir.
1996); Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 n.8 (2d Cir. 1994)).
"I Id. (quoting Hormel Foods Corp., 73 F.3d at 507).
106 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994).
107 Id. at 40-41.
108 See, e.g., Diversified Mktg., Inc. v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (no dilution under New York law where defendant used name for comparison pur-
poses with advertising slogan, "If You Like Estee Lauder ... You'll Love Beauty USA").
109 15 U.S.C. §1125(c) (2000).
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asserting that its own products are as good or better. This case differed, how-
ever, because the plaintiff alleged likelihood of dilution rather than confusion.
In addition, the court found that the defendant's intent was not to disparage the
quality of John Deere products-in fact, "[t]he intent was to identify Deere as
the market leader and convey the message that Yard-Man was of comparable
quality but less costly than a Deere lawn tractor."'10
The deer logo in the ad was slightly different from the genuine Deere deer,
but was apparently recognizable:
[T]he deer in the Commercial Logo is animated and assumes various poses. Specifi-
cally, the MTD deer looks over its shoulder, jumps through the logo frame (which
breaks into pieces and tumbles to the ground), hops to a pinging noise, and, as a two-
dimensional cartoon, runs, in apparent fear, as it is pursued by the Yard-Man lawn
tractor and a barking dog. Judge McKenna described the dog as 'recognizable as a
breed that is short in stature,' and in the commercial the fleeing deer appears to be
even smaller than the dog. [Defendant] Doner's interoffice documents reflect that
the animated deer in the commercial was intended to appear "more playful and/or
confused than distressed."' 1
The district court rejected Deere's claims based on likelihood-of-confu-
sion and false advertising, but issued a preliminary injunction based on New
York's antidilution statute. 12
In affirming the district court, the court of appeals held that the defendant
had manifested "predatory intent" by "poking fun at a competitor's trade-
mark."' II It defined "predatory intent" as "an intent to promote one's prod-
uct."11 4 In the appellate court's view, this intent distinguished dilutive uses of
another's trademark from "uses that seek to make a social or political commen-
tary or an artistic expression."'115
The court conceded that the facts established neither blurring nor tarnish-
ment. However, the court found it significant that the defendant had altered
the Deere trademark in the course of making fun of it.' 16 By altering the deer,
the court concluded, the defendant exceeded the bounds of lawful comparative
advertising:
The commercial takes a static image of a graceful, full-size deer-symbolizing
Deere's substance and strength-and portrays, in an animated version, a deer that
appears smaller than a small dog and scampers away from the dog and a lawn tractor,
looking over its shoulder in apparent fear. Alterations of that sort, accomplished for
the sole purpose of promoting a competing product, are properly found to be within
New York's concept of dilution because they risk the possibility that consumers will
come to attribute unfavorable characteristics to a mark and ultimately associate the
mark with inferior goods and services.
117
MTD remains free to deliver its message of alleged product superiority without alter-
ing and thereby diluting Deere's trademarks. The Court's order imposes no restric-
l10 Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 41.
"I Id.
112 Id. at 42.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 46.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 45.
117 Id.
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tion on truthful advertising properly comparing specific products and their
"objectively measurable attributes."' 18
If the Deere court really meant to restrict comparative advertising to
"objectively measurable attributes," this would raise the specter of dilution
claims against the kind of general puffery that has enjoyed long acceptance in
the marketplace. Under traditional comparative advertising doctrine, MTD
could lawfully have claimed that its Yard-Man tractors "run rings around John
Deere." By using images instead of words to convey the same message, MTD
became liable for dilution under the laws of New York. Such a result is simply
absurd.
Deere appears to be the only case-so far-which has held a defendant
liable for making good-natured (and non-confusing) fun of its competitor's
logo. Perhaps future cases will pit Coca-Cola against Pepsi for Pepsi's televi-
sion ads depicting Coke as the beverage of senior citizens, and perhaps
Anheuser-Busch will sue the Miller Brewing Co. for Miller's ads making fun
of Budweiser's Clydesdale and frog mascots, or depicting referees calling pen-
alties on people caught drinking Budweiser." 9 Surely dilution law was not
intended to prevent tough competitors from entertaining us with over-the-top
commercials and generalized claims of superiority. Perhaps someday beer
commercials will be as dull as pharmaceutical ads. If Kool-Aid can survive
Jonestown, and Tylenol can survive one of the worst product tampering epi-
sodes in history, then surely Deere's deer can handle a little tail-pulling.
Commercial parody occasionally wins out in dilution cases, although it is
difficult to predict which parodies will prevail. For example, in Ringling Bros. -
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp.,120 Ringling
Bros. brought a tarnishment claim against the owner of "The Greatest Bar on
Earth" for linking the circus' name to "an adult establishment where alcohol is
served." The court rejected the tarnishment claim, because "alcohol is served
at some of the venues where the circus performs, and some of Ringling's res-
taurant sponsors also sell alcohol." It also concluded that the two marks were
insufficiently similar for dilution to occur.' 2 ' Although the court correctly
observed that Congress intended the FTDA to coexist with state antidilution
statutes, it inexplicably concluded that this required it to use the same legal
analysis under both statutes.122 Although it construed the FTDA as excluding
consideration of predatory intent, it applied the remaining Sweet factors (the
multi-factor test applicable to the New York antidilution statute) in assessing
the likelihood of dilution under the FTDA. 123
"I Id. (quoting FTC Policy Statement on Comparative Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 14.15 n. 1
(1993)).
119 That day may be here already. In 2004, Miller filed suit over several of Anheuser-
Busch's anti-Miller ads, including a Budweiser ad proclaiming Miller Lite the "Queen of
Carbs." Miller later withdrew this part of its complaint, apparently preferring to duke it out
with Anheuser-Busch during half-time commercials on Monday Night Football.
120 937 F. Supp. 204, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 209.
123 Id. At 215. For a discussion of the Sweet factors, see supra text accompanying notes
52-55.
[Vol. 6:447
Winter 2005/2006] STEAM SHOVELS AND LIPSTICK
In Toho Co., Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 124 the Ninth Circuit rejected a
claim brought under California's antidilution statute by the owner of the
"Godzilla" character against a defendant that sold garbage bags in packages
displaying the name "Bagzilla" along with a cartoon drawing of a reptilian
creature. The Ninth Circuit confessed that it "regarded the antidilution doctrine
with some concern 'lest it swallow up all competition in the claim of protection
against trade name infringement."" 25 With little analysis, the court stated con-
clusorily that "Sears' use of 'Bagzilla' has not impaired the effectiveness of the
name and image of Godzilla. Neither does Sears' use of the reptilian monster
character on its garbage bag packages link Godzilla with something unsavory
or degrading .... 126 This explains the court's rejection of the tarnishment
claim. With respect to blurring, however, because the court offered no further
explanation of its reasoning, it is not clear whether its decision was based on
the dissimilarity of the marks, or on the court's perception of the marks as
parody, or on some other factor, such as a lack of predatory intent or the court's
confessed discomfort with the overall concept of dilution.
Many courts find a likelihood of dilution merely because the senior user's
mark is sufficiently strong or famous to warrant protection, and the junior
user's mark is similar to that of the senior user, with no requirement of preda-
tory intent or of any specific evidence showing that the selling power of the
plaintiff's mark has been or is likely to be harmed. In effect, fame plus similar-
ity leads to a presumption of dilution. For example, in Toys R Us, Inc. v.
Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc.,27 the court found both a likelihood of confusion
and a likelihood of dilution by blurring under New York's antidilution statute,
where the defendant used the slogan "Kids R Us" to market children's clothing:
In the instant case, due to the extensive advertising conducted by plaintiff and its
high sales volume, the trademark Toys "R" Us evokes in the minds of consumers
images of a large warehouse-like store offering for sale at economical prices a large
variety of toys and other child related products. This image provoking characteristic
of the Toys "R" Us trademark establishes its associational qualities which entitle it to
protection from dilution. Furthermore, although the two names are distinguishable,
the identity of the "R" Us suffixes and the similarity of the children's products sold
by the stores compels me to conclude that the name Kids 'r' Us is likely to blur Toys
"R" Us' product identification. Clearly, the distinctiveness of plaintiffs mark is
being "whittled away" by a proliferation of "R" Us names, including Kids 'r' Us,
and the mark's accompanying selling power is being diluted. 128
The emphasized language suggests that, in this court's view, dilution was
established simply by showing that the senior mark was strong and the junior
mark was similar. Injury was, in effect, presumed.
124 645 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981).
125 Id. at 793 (quoting Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 803
(1970).
126 Id. (distinguishing Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836, 844 (Mass.
Dist. Ct. 1964); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1191-92
(E.D.N.Y. 1972); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d
200, 202-03 (2d Cir. 1979)).
127 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1208 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
128 Id. (emphasis added). A similar presumption was used in the Dallas Cowboys Cheer-
leaders case, discussed in the text accompanying note 165, infra.
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Similarly, Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet,12 9 affirmed a preliminary injunction under the Illi-
nois antidilution statute against a used car dealership that used a circus motif
together with the slogan "The Greatest Used Car Show on Earth." The lower
court found dilution by blurring because "The Ringling Bros. mark invokes a
Pavlovian response from the public, who immediately associate the mark with
the circus,"'13 and the Seventh Circuit affirmed with no further analysis other
than to observe that the nature of the injury was "unquantifiable, and thus irrep-
arable," and that the Illinois statute was not preempted by the "fair use" provi-
sion of federal trademark law (pre-FTDA)."3 '
As these examples illustrate, while the cases involving pure commercial
speech are relatively uncomplicated, the courts are surprisingly inconsistent in
the analysis they employ to determine whether dilution is likely to occur. In
many cases, if the plaintiffs mark is famous and distinctive, and the defen-
dant's mark is similar, the courts have required nothing further to conclude that
dilution (at least by blurring) is established. They have not required any evi-
dence that the selling power of the famous mark has been or is likely to be
undermined. These courts simply do not contemplate the possibility that a jun-
ior user's use of a mark closely resembling a famous mark could do no harm at
all. Thus, in effect, they treat dilution law as giving rise to an absolute property
right in famous marks. Other courts, in contrast, appear reluctant to embrace
this as the inevitable consequence of antidilution legislation, and attempt
instead to reframe dilution claims as confusion-based claims by importing
many of the likelihood-of-confusion factors into the dilution analysis. This is
not the result of differences in the state statutes, because all of them are remark-
ably similar. Rather, it seems to reflect a profound lack of consensus on just
what dilution law is all about, and whether it represents sound policy in the first
place.
B. Traditional Expressive Works
Whereas purely commercial speech receives relatively little First Amend-
ment protection, traditional forms of expression-such as literature, music, and
film-typically enjoy broad First Amendment protection. However, this is not
always true under dilution law.
Thus far, the cases convincingly demonstrate that traditional expression
fares better under the FTDA than under state dilution laws, because the federal
statute contains an explicit exception for noncommercial uses. In contrast,
expressive works are more vulnerable under state antidilution statutes, which
typically fail to incorporate any express exceptions, even for protected speech.
The different outcomes are particularly noticeable in the context of parody and
satire.
129 855 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1988).
130 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettleson Chevrolet
Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d 1300, 1302 (N.D. I11. 1987) (magistrate opinion), aff'd, 855 F.2d
480 (7th Cir. 1988).
131 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 855 F.2d at 483-84 (citing 15
U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4)).
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For example, Barbie has been at the center of several dilution cases
involving parody. This is hardly surprising, given Barbie's iconic status as a
controversial symbol of American pop culture and idealized body images. In
effect, Barbie has transcended her role as a branded product and has assumed a
far loftier role in public discourse.
In one of the Barbie cases, Mattel sought to use the FTDA to enjoin the
distribution of a series of seventy-eight photographs entitled "Food Chain
Barbie," which depicted Barbie dolls under threat of imminent bodily harm
from vintage kitchen appliances. 132 Sample titles included "Malted Barbie,"
"Fondue a la Barbie," and "Barbie Enchiladas."' 133 The Ninth Circuit wasted
no time rejecting the claim, holding that "a dilution action applies only to
purely commercial speech," and that "[p]arody is a form of noncommercial
expression if it does more than propose a commercial transaction."'
134
In another Barbie case, Mattel filed an FTDA claim against MCA
Records, alleging that the Top-40 pop song "Barbie Girl" diluted the Barbie
trademark. 135 Specifically, Mattel advanced both blurring and tarnishment the-
ories, arguing that the song "diminishes the mark's capacity to identify and
distinguish Mattel products, and tarnishes the mark because the song is inap-
propriate for young girls."' 36 The Ninth Circuit held that this use of the Barbie
mark was unquestionably dilutive under a blurring theory:
MCA's use of the mark is dilutive. MCA does not dispute that, while a reference to
Barbie would previously have brought to mind only Mattel's doll, after the song's
popular success, some consumers hearing Barbie's name will think of both the doll
and the song, or perhaps of the song only. This is a classic blurring injury and is in
no way diminished by the fact that the song itself refers back to Barbie the doll. To
be dilutive, use of the mark need not bring to mind the junior user alone. The distinc-
tiveness of the mark is diminished if the mark no longer brings to mind the senior
user alone. 1
37
Although the Ninth Circuit found dilution by blurring (and thus found
it unnecessary to reach the tarnishment claim), the court also applied the
FTDA's noncommercial use exception, which the court interpreted as appli-
cable to any speech which does more than propose a commercial transaction. 1
38
132 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
133 Id. at 796.
131 Id. at 812 (emphasis added).
135 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
136 Id. at 902-03.
137 id. at 903-04 (footnotes omitted).
138 Id. at 906. The legislative history of the FTDA indicates congressional intent that the
law would "not prohibit or threaten noncommercial expression, such as parody, satire, edito-
rial and other forms of expression that are not a part of a commercial transaction." 141
CONG. REc. S19306-10 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 141 CONG. REC.
H14317-01, H14318 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead); H.R. Rep. No.
104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031 ("The bill will not prohibit
or threaten 'noncommercial' expression, as that term has been defined by the courts."); H.R.
Rep. No. 104-374, at 8, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1035 (the exemption
"expressly incorporates the concept of 'commercial' speech from the 'commercial speech'
doctrine, and proscribes dilution actions that seek to enjoin use of famous marks in 'non-
commercial' uses (such as consumer product reviews)"); 141 CONG. REC. S19306-10,
S19311 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (the exemption "is consistent with existing case law[,
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The Ninth Circuit held that "Barbie Girl" fit squarely within this
exception. 3 9
A federal district court reached a similar conclusion in Dr. Seuss Enter-
prises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,14° where it applied the FTDA's non-
commercial use exception to a book entitled "The Cat Not in the Hat," which
was a rhyming satire of the O.J. Simpson murder trial.' 4 ' The book contained
numerous trademarks owned by the plaintiff-including the cat character, the
Cat in the Hat title, and the cat's characteristic stovepipe hat.
The district court denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction
on the grounds of dilution, because it held that the defendant's book was an
expressive use rather than commercial use. 14 2
Unlike the FTDA, state dilution statutes typically do not include any spe-
cific exceptions for noncommercial speech, forcing defendants to rely on gen-
eral First Amendment arguments. One might expect that traditional expressive
works would fare well under this approach. The reality is quite the contrary.
One such case, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications,
143
involved a humor magazine called "Snicker," which published on its back
cover a fictitious ad for a beer called "Michelob Oily." Besides the Michelob
name, the ad included other references to Anheuser-Busch trademarks, but in a
context that was clearly intended as a parody. The accompanying graphics
included a partially-obscured can of Michelob Dry pouring oil onto a fish, an
oil-soaked rendition of the plaintiff's "A & Eagle" design (with the eagle
exclaiming "Yuck!") below a Shell Oil symbol, and various "Michelob Oily"
products "bearing a striking resemblance to appellants' Michelob family. Sev-
eral other Anheuser-Busch trademarks were visible. In smaller text the ad
warned, "At the rate it's being dumped into our oceans, lakes and rivers, you'll
drink it oily sooner or later, anyway." In even smaller text, running vertically
along the side of the page, there appeared a disclaimer: "Snicker Magazine
Editorial by Rich Balducci. Art by Eugene Ruble. Thank goodness someone
still cares about quality (of life).""'4
One would think that anyone reading a magazine called "Snicker," which
was filled with humorous content, would understand that the ad for "Michelob
Oily" was a joke. However, Anheuser-Busch was not amused. The maker of
Michelob beer sued the magazine for trademark infringement under the Lan-
ham Act, and for dilution under the Missouri antidilution statute, arguing that
the fictitious ad implied that Michelob beer was tainted with oil. 145
The defendants argued that their fake ad was intended as an editorial com-
mentary on: (1) the effects of environmental pollution, including a specific
reference to the then-recent Shell oil spill in the Gasconade River-a source of
which] recognize[s] that the use of marks in certain forms of artistic and expressive speech is
protected by the First Amendment").
139 Mattel, Inc., 296 F. 3d at 907.
140 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1574 (S.D. Cal. 1996), afftd, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
141 Sample verse: "A man this famous/Never hires/Lawyers like/Jacoby-Meyers."
142 924 F. Supp at 1574. However, the district court granted a preliminary injunction on the
trademark infringement claim, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
143 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994).
'44 Id. at 772.
145 Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 28 F.3d at 772.
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Anheuser-Busch's water supply; (2) Anheuser-Busch's subsequent decision to
temporarily close its St. Louis brewery; and (3) the proliferation of Anheuser-
Busch beer brands and advertisements. 146
The court of appeal found a likelihood of confusion that was not out-
weighed by First Amendment considerations, holding that even an editorial
parody could give rise to infringement liability if readers were likely to be
confused into thinking that the trademark owner endorsed or approved of the
editorial content. 147 Balancing the public interest in free expression against the
public interest in avoiding consumer confusion, in this case the court found that
the risk of confusion was great enough to override free expression. 4 8 The
court's holding strongly implies, however, that a more prominent disclaimer,
and less literal copying of the plaintiff's marks, would have been sufficient to
tilt the balance the other way. 1
49
Of greater concern, then, is the court's resolution of the plaintiff s dilution
claim under the Missouri statute. The appellate court held that the district court
had erred in dismissing the dilution claim, because survey evidence indicated
that many of the consumers surveyed understood the ad to suggest that
Michelob beer contained oil:'" °
In this case, the majority of those surveyed construed the ad parody as suggesting
that Michelob beer contains oil. This relationship obviously tarnishes the marks'
carefully-developed images. Moreover, the tarnishment results from a negative,
although vague, statement about the quality of the product represented by the
trademark. 151
Note, however, that the survey showed only that these consumers under-
stood the ad parody to suggest that the beer contained oil. It would be astonish-
ing, of course, if they had perceived it any other way. Of course it suggested
that the beer contained oil; that was the point of the joke. What the plaintiff's
survey did not show was whether these consumers actually believed that this
allegation was true. In all likelihood, they simply recognized it as a funny but
ridiculous accusation.
In effect, Balducci held that making a joke about a product violates Mis-
souri's antidilution statute. Liability arose even without proof that anyone
would take the joke seriously, and even if the joke was made in the context of
pure expression rather than commercial speech. Balducci represents dilution
law run amok.
If the Balducci approach were to become widespread, it could lead to dilu-
tion liability even in situations where courts have been willing to tolerate some
degree of consumer confusion in order to uphold First Amendment protections
for parodies. For example, in Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell
146 Id. at 772.
147 Id. at 776.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 777.
150 Id.
'"' Id. Arguably, this constitutes common law trade libel rather than dilution, since it
involves making false statements about a product which readers would believe to be true.
Under this theory, liability would arise even if this were not a parody but a straight-forward
news story or editorial commentary, and regardless of whether the plaintiff's marks were
famous or even highly distinctive.
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Publishing Group, Inc. ,152 the publisher of the Cliff's Notes study guides sued
the publisher of the "Spy Notes" parodies on a likelihood of confusion theory.
The "Spy Notes" parodies did copy much of the distinctive plaintiff's trade
dress, but they were clearly labeled as parodies. The court ruled in defendant's
favor. Because the parodies fell into the realm of traditional artistic expression,
the court applied a balancing approach under which, "in deciding the reach of
the Lanham Act in any case where an expressive work is alleged to infringe a
trademark, it is appropriate to weigh the public interest in free expression
against the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion."' 53 Because, in the
court's view, "somewhat more risk of confusion is to be tolerated when a trade-
mark holder seeks to enjoin artistic expression such as a parody," the possibil-
ity of some consumer confusion in this case did not outweigh the public interest
in allowing expression in the form of parody. The court also added: "[W]e do
not believe that there is a likelihood that an ordinarily prudent purchaser would
think that Spy Notes is actually a study guide produced by appellee, as opposed
to a parody of Cliffs Notes."
There was no dilution claim in the Cliff's Notes case. One can imagine,
however, a claim based on tarnishment, because each edition of Spy Notes
ridiculed not only contemporary literature, but also the Cliff's Notes approach
to summarizing literary works, presumably for those too lazy to read the origi-
nal. One could argue, then, that even if a reader were not confused into think-
ing that Cliff's Notes actually published or endorsed Spy Notes, the parody
could be understood to suggest that Cliff's Notes are unworthy publications.
Under the dilution rationale in the "Michelob Oily" case, this could, unfortu-
nately, be sufficient to support a tarnishment claim.
In Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Products, Inc.,' 54 the publisher of Screw
Magazine published a sexually explicit cartoon featuring the "Poppin' Fresh"
character 55 and other Pillsbury trademarks. Pillsbury sued for trademark
infringement and copyright infringement, and also brought blurring and tarnish-
152 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
153 Id. at 494.
154 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 135 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
151 Poppin' Fresh is also commonly known as the Pillsbury Dough Boy. Pillsbury gradually
introduced other characters to fill out the Poppin' Fresh family, including Mrs. Poppin'
Fresh (a.k.a "Poppy"), their son and daughter Popper and Poppie Fresh, a baby named Bun
Bun, a dog named Flapjack, a cat named Biscuit, and grandparents Granmommer and
Granpopper. Long associated with the slogan, "Nothin' says lovin' like something from the
oven"; the Dough Boy became something of a cultural icon, and an object of irreverent
humor. In a 1998 monologue, Jay Leno reported that "'75% of people surveyed say they
believe that the Pillsbury Dough Boy is a virgin. Apparently, not everybody loves Sara
Lee."' See http://www.tvacres.com/admascots-poppinfresh.htm. An obituary for Poppin'
Fresh has also made the rounds of the internet:
Veteran Pillsbury spokesman Pop N. Fresh died yesterday of a severe yeast infection. He was
71. Fresh was buried in one of the largest funeral ceremonies in recent years. Dozens of celebri-
ties turned out including Mrs. Butterworth, the California Raisins, Hungry Jack, Betty Crocker,
and the Hostess Twinkies. The graveside was piled high with flours as longtime friend Aunt
Jemima delivered the eulogy, describing Fresh as a man who "never knew how much he was
kneaded."
Fresh rose quickly in show business, but his later life was filled with many turnovers. He was
not considered a very smart cookie, wasting much of his dough on half-baked schemes. Still,
even as a crusty old man, he was a roll model for millions. Dough boy is survived by his wife,
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ment claims under the Georgia antidilution statute. Although the court rejected
the copyright claim on fair use grounds, and found insufficient likelihood of
confusion to support the trademark infringement claim, the court granted a pre-
liminary injunction on the blurring and tarnishment claims. With no analysis,
and no discussion of the First Amendment, the court simply concluded that
"despite the lack of actual damages, there is a likelihood that the defendants'
presentation could injure the business reputation of the plaintiff or dilute the
distinctive quality of its trademarks."
1 56
In one of the few decisions to recognize a robust First Amendment defense
to dilution, the First Circuit in L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc. '51
applied general First Amendment principles to a state antidilution statute which
contained no explicit exception for expressive works. Retailer L.L. Bean
brought suit under Maine's antidilution statute when High Society, an adult-
oriented magazine, published a prurient parody of the L.L. Bean catalog as a
two-page article. As described by the district court, "[t]he article displayed a
facsimile of Bean's trademark and featured pictures of nude models in sexually
explicit positions using 'products' that were described in a crudely humorous
fashion."1 58 The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on
the dilution claim, citing tarnishment of L.L. Bean's goodwill and reputation,
and issued an injunction, but the First Circuit reversed.
Because the statute contained no exception for noncommercial speech,
both courts relied on general First Amendment principles. However, they dis-
agreed on the particular test that should apply. The district court adopted a
very strict standard, holding that "[p]laintiff's trademark is in the nature of a
property right, .. . and as such it need not 'yield to the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of com-
munication exist.' ,159
The appellate court disagreed, holding that "[t]he limits imposed on a
trademark owner's property rights demonstrate that the constitutional issue
raised here cannot be dispensed with by simply asserting that Bean's property
right need not yield to the exercise of first amendment rights." 16' The court
pointed out that the magazine's table of contents clearly labeled the article as
"humor" and "parody." In vacating the injunction, the court noted that "[tihe
ridicule conveyed by parody inevitably conflicts with one of the underlying
purposes of the Maine anti-dilution statute, which is to protect against the
tarnishment of the goodwill and reputation associated with a particular
trademark."' 16
1
Play Dough, two children, John Dough and Jane Dough, and his elderly father, Pop Tart. The
funeral was held at 3:50 for about twenty minutes.
Id. More recently, Pillsbury's own advertising explored the libidinous side of Poppin' Fresh,
in a television ad which featured the blobby character gyrating suggestively to the throbbing
bass of a Barry White song, while a couple gazed deeply into one another's eyes and fed
each other hot biscuits. Internet bloggers went wild, expressing both shock and delight.
156 Pillsbury Co., 215 U.S.P.Q. at 135.
157 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987).
158 Id. at 27.
159 Id. at 29 (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)).
160 Id.
161 Id. at 28.
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Unlike other courts that have addressed dilution claims under state stat-
utes, the First Circuit recognized that, despite the absence of statutory excep-
tions for expressive works, state antidilution legislation must not be permitted
to encroach on protected speech. Unfortunately, as the cases demonstrate,
courts display widely varying sensitivities to the First Amendment considera-
tions that arise in dilution cases, and have not reached a consensus on the
appropriate legal test for balancing the private interest in protecting a trademark
against the public interest in free expression. The sophistication of the First
Circuit's approach to these issues in the L.L. Bean case should have served as a
model for other courts analyzing state law dilution claims in the context of
parody. Thus far, however, it has had surprisingly little impact.
One might expect that motion pictures, which are generally viewed as
expressive speech rather than commercial advertising, would enjoy a high
degree of First Amendment protection against dilution claims. However, that is
not always the case, and in this context as well it appears that the FTDA's
noncommercial use exception provides greater protection for expressive speech
than courts have been willing to recognize under the general First Amendment
principles which should apply to state law dilution claims.
In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,162 the
Cheerleaders organization objected to the use of its distinctive costumes in the
adult-oriented film Debbie Does Dallas, raising claims under the traditional
likelihood-of-confusion doctrine as well as New York's antidilution statute.
The defendants advertised the movie with marquee posters and newspaper ads
depicting the main character, Debbie, played by actress Bambi Woods, wearing
the allegedly infringing uniform and containing such captions as "Starring Ex
Dallas Cowgirl Cheerleader Bambi Woods" and "You'll do more than cheer for
this X Dallas Cheerleader." Actress Bambi Woods, in fact, had never been a
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader. 163 The court found that there was a likelihood
that consumers would believe that the Cheerleaders organization had sponsored
or approved the use of its uniforms in the film, or was in some other way
connected to the film. 16
4
In the Cheerleaders case, the potential for confusion was substantial
enough to warrant a preliminary injunction. However, the Second Circuit also
ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to a preliminary injunction on dilution
grounds. As is typical of many dilution cases, the court simply tacked dilution
onto its confusion analysis, almost as an afterthought, in a footnote which
offered no analysis other than the statement that dilution law allows a trade-
mark owner to enjoin copying "despite the absence of confusion as to source or
sponsorship."'' 65 The court treated the plaintiffs allegations of dilution as suf-
ficient in themselves to support preliminary injunctive relief, and made no
162 467 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
163 604 F.2d at 203 & n.2.
164 Id. at 205. In some situations, that might be a reasonable conclusion, as the public is
increasingly familiar with the concept of product placement, and is likely to believe that any
appearance of a recognizable trademark in a film was "bought and paid for." But situations
that are likely to be perceived as product placements are typically very different from situa-
tions in which a defendant is clearly poking fun at or criticizing the plaintiff or its mark.
165 Id. at 205 n.8.
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attempt to determine whether blurring or tarnishment had in fact occurred, or
were likely to occur.
As to the First Amendment, the court held that the movie did not qualify
as parody, and that, to the extent the movie was intended as a commentary on
"sexuality in athletics," its expressive content did not justify the unauthorized
use of the plaintiff's trademark. In reaching this conclusion, the court adopted
the "adequate alternative avenues" approach to First Amendment protection:
Plaintiff's trademark is in the nature of a property right, and as such it need not "yield
to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate alter-
native avenues of communication exist." Because there are numerous ways in which
defendants may comment on "sexuality in athletics" without infringing plaintiff's
trademark, the district court did not encroach upon their first amendment rights in
granting a preliminary injunction. 166
This was the same approach that was rejected in the L.L. Bean case.16 7
In 1995, Hormel, the maker of Spam, sought an injunction under New
York's antidilution statute in order to prevent the release of a Muppets film and
related merchandise which included a new Muppet character named
"Spa'am."'1 68 In the film, Spa'am was the high priest of a tribe of wild boars
that worshipped Miss Piggy as its Queen Boom Sha Ka La Ka La. In the
Second Circuit's words, the purpose of the Spa'am character was "to poke a
little fun at Hormel's famous luncheon meat by associating its processed, gelat-
inous block with a humorously wild beast."' 169 Hormel's complaint objected to
the character, on the ground that sales of Spam might diminish if it were linked
with "evil in porcine form. '
17 °
In an obvious parody such as this, courts are extremely unlikely to find
dilution by blurring. The success of the parody depends on the existence of a
strong association between the trademark and the goods or services for which it
has become famous, and the fact that the parody is ridiculing the mark is
unlikely to weaken that association. Thus, there was no serious question of
blurring in this case.17 '
However, tarnishment is a different matter. The object of parody is to
ridicule its target. Thus, tarnishment is the natural and intended result of a
successful parody. As the Second Circuit noted, "The sine qua non of tarnish-
166 Id. at 206 (citations omitted).
167 The adequate alternative avenues approach was also followed in Reddy Comm., Inc. v.
Envtl. Action Found., Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 630 (D.D.C. 1977), supp. decision at 477 F.
Supp. 936 (D.C. 1979), where the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from using nega-
tive caricatures of Reddy Kilowatt in books and newspaper columns critical of the electrical
utilities. There, however, the court denied preliminary injunctive relief, finding that no like-
lihood of confusion had been established. No dilution claim was raised. The adequate alter-
native avenues approach was applied to dilution claims in Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak,
836 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1987), which involved parodic T-shirts and other novelty items.
See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
168 Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996).
169 Id. at 501.
170 Id.
171 Hormel Foods v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., No. 95 Civ. 5473 (KMW), 1995 WL 567369,
*11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1995), aff'd, 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996).
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ment is a finding that plaintiff's mark will suffer negative associations through
defendant's use."'
172
In the context of a motion picture, or other expressive works, one might
think that the expressive context of the parody would warrant such a high
degree of First Amendment protection that a tarnishment claim should be
rejected as a matter of course. In Hormel, however, that was not the case.
Instead, the district court engaged in a detailed analysis of whether the Spa'am
character was, in the court's words, "unsavory" or "unhygienic." Happily for
the Muppets, the Spa'am character was neither of these, although the same
could not be said of the porcine characters surrounding him.173 Also helpful, in
the court's view, was the fact that Hormel's product was already a frequent
target of negative humor.17 4 In addition, the court noted that the Muppets film
was itself a "high-quality, good-humored, family-oriented motion picture." 175
This implies that, if the film had been X-rated, the court would have been more
inclined to find dilution by tarnishment. Finally, the court suggested that a
finding of dilution on these facts would be inappropriate for yet another rea-
son-the absence of predatory intent, which the court defined as "the intent 'of
either appropriating for itself the goodwill associated with the plaintiffs name
and/or mark, or of capitalizing on consumer confusion between the two
products.' "176
What would qualify as predatory intent? Suppose that the filmmaker had
depicted the Spa'am character as unsavory and unhygienic, and had done so in
order to tarnish the image of Hormel's meat product? Or suppose a different
filmmaker were to imitate the trademark or trade dress of Wal-Mart or McDon-
ald's in a parody that was designed to criticize those companies? Such a par-
ody would not be actionable as false advertising or defamation if it were clearly
labeled as fiction or a mere expression of opinion. Would dilution law offer the
plaintiff an end-run around these doctrines?
In Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theaters, 17 7 a district court held
that the plaintiffs "Tarzan" trademark was diluted by the use of "Tarz" in the
title of an X-rated film and as the name of a character in the film. Although no
specific antidilution statute was mentioned, the case predated the FTDA and
appears to have involved California's dilution law. The court did not consider
whether, or to what extent, the use of the plaintiffs mark should be treated as
protected expression.
In contrast to their treatment under state antidilution statutes, the early
indications suggest that films will fare well under the FTDA. Although thus far
very few federal dilution claims have been brought against films, because the
FTDA was not enacted until 1995, the one case that has been decided under the
FIDA squarely held that films fall under the statute's "noncommercial use"
172 Honnel Foods, 73 F.3d at 507.
173 Hormel Foods, 1995 WL 567369, at *11-12.
174 Id. at *12.
175 Id.
176 Id. at *13 (citing Giorgio Beverly Hills, Inc. v. Revlon Consumer Prods. Corp., 869 F.
Supp. 176, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
177 No. 76-3612, 1976 WL 20994, at *162 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 1976).
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exception. In Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Market Group, Ltd., the plaintiff
brought a federal dilution claim when its "Star Wars" trademark was used in an
animated adult film. The court labeled the defendant's film a "pornographic
parody," and agreed that it tarnished the "Star Wars" trademark. However,
citing Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. ,179-the "Barbie Girl" case-the court
ruled in favor of the defendant, on the ground that "[p]arody is a form of non-
commercial, protected speech" which is exempt from liability under the non-
commercial use exception of the FTDA. 1 80
MasterCard Intern. Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Committee, Inc.,' 81 offers
an enlightening example of how differently a single expressive use can be ana-
lyzed by the same court under federal and state antidilution statutes. In that
case, MasterCard brought dilution claims under the FTDA and the New York
antidilution statute against a television ad for presidential candidate Ralph
Nader which spoofed MasterCard's well-known "priceless" ads. Like the Mas-
terCard ads, the Nader ad recited a list of costly items, followed by a priceless
intangible:
Grilled tenderloin for fund-raiser: $1,000 a plate.
Campaign ads filled with half-truths: $10 million.
Promises to special interest groups: over $100 billion.
Finding out the truth: priceless.
There are some things that money can't buy.
The district court rejected the federal dilution claim because the ad consti-
tuted political speech, and was therefore exempt under the FTDA's "noncom-
mercial use" exception.' 8 ' On the New York dilution claim, therefore, one
might have expected the court to hold that the First Amendment offered the
defendant similar protection. On the contrary, the court did not even mention
the First Amendment. Instead, it held, with almost no analysis, that there was
simply insufficient proof that the Nader ads were likely to cause dilution either
by blurring or tarnishment.' 8 3 This stands in striking contrast to other cases
which have found a likelihood of dilution simply because a senior user's mark
was strong and the junior user's mark was similar. 184 In all likelihood, the
district court was simply looking for something within the New York statute
that would exempt Nader's political speech. Either the court, or Nader's legal
team, was unwilling to test the New York dilution claim against the First
Amendment.
A case which provides a useful contrast to Mastercard is American Fam-
ily Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 8 5 where a gubernatorial candidate's internet ads
mimicked the well-known AFLAC duck in making fun of the incumbent Rob-
ert Taft. The ads featured a crudely animated character made up of Taft's head
178 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 179 A.L.R. Fed. 659 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
179 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1155 (C.D. Cal.1998).
180 Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Market Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 900-01 (N.D. Cal.
2002).
1s No. 00 Civ.6068(GBD), 2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004).
182 Id. at *7-*9 (also holding, in the alternative, that MasterCard had failed to prove actual
dilution, as required by the FTDA).
183 Id. at *9.
184 See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
185 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
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sitting on the body of a white cartoon duck, with a yellow duck's bill where the
governor's mouth should be. The duck would quack "Taftquack" at various
times during the ads, in a nasal tone highly reminiscent of the "AFLAC" sound
made by the AFLAC duck.' 86 The ads could be viewed at the defendant's
website www.taftquack.com.
At an early stage of the proceeding, AFLAC brought its dilution claim
solely under the FTDA. When the district court denied relief, it did so based
solely on the "noncommercial use" exception of the FTDA, stating that in all
other respects the plaintiff had made a good case for dilution.'8 7 Waddling
quickly, the plaintiff promptly refiled under Ohio's common law of dilution,
which contained no commercial use exception.' 8 8 Waddling even faster, the
district court denied the common law claim as well, declaring the ad to be
political speech protected by the First Amendment.'
89
Like the L.L. Bean case, American Family Life shows that the federal
courts are capable of imposing First Amendment limits on state antidilution
laws; MasterCard shows that they cannot always be relied upon to do so.
The case law thus demonstrates that, in practice, even the most traditional
expressive works have generally received greater protection against dilution
claims under the noncommercial use exception of the FTDA than they have
under general First Amendment principles. The inconsistent treatment of such
works under the FTDA and state antidilution statutes creates an unacceptable
level of uncertainty for potential defendants, resulting in a potentially chilling
effect on free expression.
The future of the noncommercial use exception is currently in doubt. The
first version of the TDRA amendments to the FTDA would have eliminated the
language of the current noncommercial use exception-which protected the
defendants in the Barbie and Dr. Seuss cases-and replaced it with an excep-
tion for:
Fair use of a famous mark by another person, other than as a designation of source
for the person's goods or services, including for purposes of identifying and parody-
ing, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services
of the famous mark owner. 190
Unfortunately, the proposed amendment did not explain the meaning of
the term "fair use" in this context. In general, "fair use" for purposes of federal
trademark law involves the use of a term not as an origin identifier for any
goods or services offered by a defendant, but as a description of the defendant's
goods or services, or as a means to identify a competitor's goods or services for
comparative purposes."'9 Since this definition makes no sense in the context of
the noncommercial use exception, introducing the term "fair use" will add
unnecessary ambiguity to the noncommercial use exception of the FTDA. In
addition, the proposed language would not appear to protect uses of the mark
186 To quote AFLAC's counsel, the Taftquack character "obviously attempted to parrot" the
sound of the AFLAC duck. Id. at 686 n.5.
187 Id. at 692-93.
188 Id. at 692.
189 Id. at 701.
190 H.R. 683, 106th Cong., § 2 (1999).
'9' See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 11 15(b)(4), 1125(c)(4)(A) (2000).
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which involve commentary on political or social issues, as opposed to commen-
tary aimed specifically at the mark or at the owner's goods or services. This
could significantly narrow the scope of this exception.
As this Article goes to press, the Senate has just passed a revised version
of the TDRA which reinstates the noncommercial use exception. In addition,
the Senate version includes a somewhat broadened version of the "fair use"
exception which, while still not free of ambiguity, has the potential to provide
even more robust protection for commercial parodies such as Yard-Man's
tweaking of the John Deere deer. The broadened fair use exception would
exempt from FTDA claims:
Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair
use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation of source for the
person's own goods or services, including use in connection with-
(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare goods or services;
or
(ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark
owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner.
If this latest version of the TDRA is enacted, it will further highlight the
difference between state and federal dilution laws in their sensitivity to First
Amendment values, thus strengthening the case for federal preemption.
C. Expressive Merchandise
Somewhere between the extremes of traditional expressive speech and
purely commercial speech is a category that might be described as expressive
merchandise. This category includes T-shirts, posters, cards, stickers, and other
novelty items that are designed to communicate, if not sophisticated thought, at
least some aspect of the attitudes, opinions, or sense of humor of the person
using, displaying, or wearing the merchandise. The expression displayed on
the merchandise may include brand names or logos, but in this context they
serve a function other than a trademark function-that is, a function other than
indicating the origin or affiliation of the merchandise. Expressive merchandise
of this type has received virtually no First Amendment protection from
antidilution statutes. This is so despite that fact that many types of expressive
merchandise appear to qualify as noncommercial speech under the standard
repeatedly invoked by the Supreme Court, because they do more than simply
propose a commercial transaction.19 2
In general, parodies that take the form of T-shirts, posters, cards, or stick-
ers have not fared well under either the traditional likelihood of confusion anal-
ysis or dilution law. Courts simply do not accord them the same degree of First
Amendment protection enjoyed by more traditionally expressive works, such as
books and movies.
For example, in Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc. ," the maker of Cabbage Patch Dolls sued the maker of the Garbage
Pail Kids cards and stickers for trademark infringement and for violation of the
Georgia antidilution statute. The evidence indicated that "[t]he Garbage Pail
192 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983).
193 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1039 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
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Kids' stickers derisively depict dolls with features similar to Cabbage Patch
Kids dolls in rude, violent and frequently noxious settings."' 94 The defendant
had also diversified its Garbage Pail Kids offerings to include other merchan-
dise such as T-shirts, school notebooks, balloons, and so forth. The court found
both a likelihood of confusion and a likelihood of tarnishment under Georgia
law. On the tarnishment claim, the court held:
Defendant's position throughout these proceedings clearly indicates that
"defendant is borrowing plaintiffs good will to make it the butt of a joke."
There was also testimony by Mr. Robinson that any association of Garbage Pail
Kids with Cabbage Patch Kids would disparage the wholesome image plaintiff
attempts to present for its products. The court finds that there is more than
sufficient evidence that tarnishment exists such that plaintiff is substantially
likely to prevail on the merits as to its anti-dilution claim.
195
Although the defendant's products were not traditional expression along
the lines of books or movies, they nonetheless had significant expressive con-
tent. Here, as in traditional expressive works, the parody was, to a great extent,
the product itself, not just a method of promoting a product. Of the merchan-
dise in question, only the school notebooks performed a significant non-expres-
sive function. The other items-T-shirts, balloons, cards, and stickers-had
little utility outside of their expressive content. Although T-shirts have utility
as apparel, the marketplace is constantly flooded with fungible T-shirts, and the
only reason to choose a Garbage Pail Kids T-shirt would be to express one's
enthusiasm for the "Kids." Wearing a T-shirt, like placing a bumper sticker on
a car, is the speech equivalent of carrying a sign.
Would the court have reached a different decision on the Georgia dilution
claims if the defendant had given away its Garbage Pail Kids merchandise
rather than sold it for a profit? The answer is elusive, because the case was
decided under a state dilution statute, which contained no exception for non-
commercial use. But if such an exception had existed, would these novelty
items be considered a noncommercial use if they were sold? If they were given
away? If they were produced in a very small limited edition and sold to art
collectors?
Compare the fate of the Garbage Pail Kids with the outcome in Girl
Scouts v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co. 196 Here, the Girl Scouts organization
sought a preliminary injunction against the maker and distributor of a poster
which featured the image of a pregnant Girl Scout together with the Girl Scout
motto "Be Prepared." The Girl Scouts alleged infringement of numerous
marks, including their name, their trefoil logo, their motto, and their official
uniform, all of which were accurately reproduced on the poster. In addition to
their traditional infringement claim based on a likelihood of confusion as to the
source or sponsorship of the poster, the Girl Scouts brought a dilution claim
under the New York antidilution statute.
Even though the true source of the poster was printed in "regrettably small
type," the court quickly rejected the trademark infringement claims because
194 Id. at 1032.
"I Id. at 1039-40 (citing MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at § 24:15 (stating that such a result is
usually the "hallmark of the dilution doctrine")) (additional citations omitted).
196 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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there was insufficient evidence of a likelihood of confusion. Although some
members of the public had called the Girl Scouts to express their indignation,
the court observed that:
[I]ndignation is not confusion. To the contrary, the indignation of those who have
called would appear to make it clear that they feel that the Girl Scouts are being
unfairly put upon, not that the Girl Scouts are the manufacturers or distributors of the
object of indignation.' 97
The court also noted that the use of the Girl Scout trademarks on the
offending poster was "unlike the situation which might exist if a pernicious
defendant attempted to sell the delicious and well-known Girl Scout cookies
door to door in cartons covered by a picture of the Girl Scouts."1 9 8 Thus, the
court recognized that the poster constituted a type of expressive merchandise
that should be treated differently from pure commercial activities.
The Girl Scouts court also rejected the plaintiffs claim under the New
York antidilution statute. Unfortunately, because the case law at the time
required a dilution claim to be supported by evidence of confusion, this part of
the court's analysis offers little insight into modern dilution law. However, the
plaintiff also raised several claims which, in the court's view, amounted to def-
amation claims; in fact, these claims bear a close resemblance to modern dilu-
tion claims that are based on tarnishment. Therefore, this part of the court's
analysis offers a useful insight into how that court might have analyzed a dilu-
tion claim if the contemporaneous case law had eschewed the likelihood of
confusion requirement, as the dilution doctrine does today.
The defamation claim contended that the defendant's poster was "intended
to impute unchastity and moral turpitude to members of plaintiff, to hold plain-
tiff up to ridicule and contempt, and to suggest that plaintiffs motto 'BE PRE-
PARED' encourages the practice of contraception." 199 However, the court
found no evidence that the "plaintiff's reputation has been or is likely to be
affected in any way by the wry, perhaps unmannerly, behavior of the defen-
dant,' '2° and, accordingly, it found no "special circumstances" that would jus-
tify enjoining or restraining "literary or spoken material. 20 1
Finally, the court held that the Girl Scouts Organization had failed to
establish that it would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary
injunction .2 02 The Girl Scouts had alleged not only that such harm would
occur, but that it had, in fact, already occurred:
Because, as set out above, millions of girls, their parents, relatives, neighbors and
friends are familiar with the purposes of the GIRL SCOUT program and are familiar
with the GIRL SCOUT uniforms, plaintiff s reputation will be and has been irrepara-
bly damaged by defendant's poster depicting a pregnant girl wearing the official
JUNIOR GIRL SCOUT uniform and prominently featuring the GIRL SCOUT motto
'BE PREPARED'.203
197 id. at 1231.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 1234.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 1235.
203 Id.
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Rejecting this assertion as conclusory, the court found no evidence that
any injury had already occurred:
No evidence is found anywhere in the record before the court that the poster has to
date damaged the plaintiff in any way. No facts are presented to show that contribu-
tions to the organization have fallen off, that members have resigned, that recruits
have failed to join, that sales either of plaintiff's posters or other items have
decreased, or that voluntary workers have dissociated themselves or declined to sup-
port the honorable work of the organization.
2 0 4
Finally, in a moment of clarity which has been absent from many subse-
quent dilution cases, the court observed:
Those who may be amused at the poster presumably never viewed the reputation of
the plaintiff as being inviolable. Those who are indignant obviously continue to
respect it. Perhaps it is because the reputation of the plaintiff is so secure against the
wry assault of the defendant that no such damage has been demonstrated.
20 5
Ironically the Girl Scouts decision extended greater protection to a mere
poster than the "Michelob Oily" court extended to an obvious parody in a
humor magazine.
Just a few years after the Girl Scouts decision, a federal court reached a
different conclusion on similar facts in the case of Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini
Rising, Inc.206 granting a preliminary injunction against the sale of a poster
consisting of the phrase "Enjoy Cocaine" printed in Coca-Cola's distinctive
stylized script, with the lettering in white against a red background, just as it
appeared in Coke's own "Enjoy Coca-Cola" posters and print ads. Because
Coca-Cola presented evidence that some consumers thought that Coca-Cola
was behind the poster, the court concluded that a likelihood of confusion had
been established. 20 7 This made the case distinguishable from the Girl Scouts
case, where no likelihood of confusion was found.2 0 8 Having already found a
likelihood of confusion, the district court addressed Coca-Cola's claims under
the New York antidilution statute almost as an afterthought. Unlike the court
that decided the Girl Scouts case, however, this court recognized that the New
York statute protected trademark owners against imitation of their marks even
in the absence of a likelihood of confusion. 2 9 The importance of protecting
Coca-Cola against injury to its business reputation and good will was, in the
court's view, sufficient to justify imposing a prior restraint and to overcome
any First Amendment concerns.2 0
In a 1987 case, the Eighth Circuit upheld an injunction which the insur-
ance company Mutual of Omaha had obtained against the maker of a T-Shirt
204 Id.
205 Id. at 1235-36.
206 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
207 Id. at 1190-91.
208 Id. at 1192. The court erred, however, when it distinguished the Girl Scouts case on a
second basis-that the Girl Scouts did not own a protectable trademark. Id.
209 Id.
210 Id. In the United Kingdom, this same design is widely available on T-shirts, as are
many other designs which make mischievous-and arguably offensive-use of famous
marks. Although the U.K. laws pertaining to likelihood of confusion are similar to the laws
of this country, the U.K. does not recognize the dilution doctrine.
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that conveyed an anti-nuclear message. 2 1 The offending T-shirt was embla-
zoned with the name "Mutant of Omaha" and the legend "Nuclear Holocaust
Insurance." In a nod to the plaintiffs famous "Indian head" logo, the T-shirt
also displayed a feather-bonneted emaciated human head. In addition to T-
shirts, the defendant marketed the same design on sweatshirts, caps, buttons,
and coffee mugs. The case predated the federal dilution statute, and the plain-
tiff's claim was based on the likelihood of confusion, rather than dilution.
Nonetheless, the court's analysis of the confusion question contains strong indi-
cations that it would have found dilution as well. For example, the court
acknowledged that the differences between the plaintiffs mark and the marks
displayed on the defendant's merchandise were substantial, perhaps even
"unmistakable." 2 12 However, in the court's view, the issue was "not whether
the public would confuse the marks, but whether the viewer of an [allegedly
infringing] mark would be likely to associate the product or service with which
it is connected with the source of products or services with which an earlier
mark is connected."2 3 Thus, the court essentially imported the dilution stan-
dard of mere "mental association" into an analysis that was supposed to focus
on the likelihood of confusion. Here, moreover, it does not appear that there
was any predatory intent: the defendant was not seeking to disparage the insur-
ance company or its trademarks, but to use them as vehicles for humorous
political commentary.
However, there was some evidence of actual confusion in this case. In a
random survey, 400 people were asked: "Would you say that Mutual of Omaha
goes along or does not go along with these T-shirts in order to make people
aware of the nuclear war problem?' 2 4 About ten percent answered that
Mutual of Omaha "goes along" with the shirts.2 5 Although the survey was
flawed in some respects, many courts would have accepted the ten percent fig-
ure as persuasive. Nonetheless, the court also noted that a whopping forty-two
percent of those surveyed said that Mutual of Omaha "came to mind" when
they viewed the T-shirts. In light of the court's prior assertion that mere
"mental association" is the standard for whether two marks are confusingly
similar, one has to wonder whether the court was more influenced by the ten
percent who were actually confused or by the forty-two percent who merely
made the mental association. (And one might wonder as well how the other
fifty-eight percent could have failed to make the association; quite possibly the
random sample included a substantial number of people who had simply never
heard of Mutual of Omaha.)
One other factor makes it difficult to assess whether the outcome in
Mutual of Omaha would have been the same under a dilution analysis. As
noted earlier, one aspect of dilution doctrine which remains unsettled is the
degree of similarity that must exist between two marks in order to find dilution.
In this case, the court acknowledged that there were substantial differences
21 Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1987).
212 Id. at 399.
213 Id. (citing James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 275 (7th
Cir. 1976)).
214 Id. at 401 n.5.
215 Id. at 401.
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between the plaintiff's distinctive marks and the defendant's design, but con-
cluded that nonetheless many people would associate one with the other.
The Mutual of Omaha case is also troubling for its adoption of the "alter-
native avenues" approach to First Amendment protection. The Eighth Circuit
rejected the defendant's First Amendment defense, on the ground that the plain-
tiff's trademarks were a form of property. Analogizing to cases involving
political speech on private property, the court held that the rights of the trade-
mark owner need not "yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under
circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist."216
The injunction barred the defendant only from using Mutual's marks "as logos"
or "to market, advertise, or identify [his] services or products," and left him
free to express his views in other ways-such as "an editorial parody in a book,
magazine, or film., 2 17 In the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders case, the Second
Circuit had adopted the same standard.21 8
It would be unfortunate indeed if this restrictive approach were to spread
to other circuits. It has deservedly been criticized by courts and commenta-
tors.219 The First Circuit had harsh words for this approach in the L.L. Bean
case:
The first amendment issues involved in this case cannot be disposed of by equating
the rights of a trademark owner with the rights of an owner of real property:
"[Tirademark is not property in the ordinary sense but only a word or symbol indi-
cating the origin of a commercial product."...
Trademark rights do not entitle the owner to quash an unauthorized use of the mark
by another who is communicating ideas or expressing points of view. As Justice
Holmes observed while sitting on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
"When the common law developed the doctrine of trademarks and trade-names, it
was not creating a property in advertisements more absolute than it would have
allowed the author of Paradise Lost." The limits imposed on a trademark owner's
property rights demonstrate that the constitutional issue raised here cannot be dis-
pensed with by simply asserting that Bean's property right need not yield to the
exercise of first amendment rights.
22 0
216 Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987).
217 Id.
218 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.
1979).
219 See, e.g., Am. Fain. Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N.D. Ohio 2002);
Robert C. Denicola, Trademark As Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging
Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 158, 206 ("the sweeping
rejection of the defendant's first amendment claim in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders is dan-
gerously simplistic.").
220 L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1987). Other courts
have criticized this "adequate alternative avenues" approach in the context of the right of
publicity-a doctrine somewhat analogous to the dilution doctrine-on the ground that it
"does not sufficiently accommodate the public's interest in free expression." Cardtoons,
L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 971 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying
this analysis to right of publicity claims). These courts have refused to "indulge in the facile
assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of
suppressing ideas in the process," noting that "[riestrictions on the words or images that may
be used by a speaker ... are quite different than restrictions on the time, place, or manner of
speech." Id.
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In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L&L Wings, Inc.,221 the Fourth Circuit rein-
stated a jury verdict of non-infringement in favor of a defendant that imitated
the general appearance of the Budweiser beer label on a novelty T-shirt that
promoted Myrtle Beach as the "King of Beaches." The plaintiff did not raise a
dilution claim, and the court found insufficient evidence of a likelihood of con-
fusion to support an infringement claim. The dissenting judge (retired Associ-
ate Justice Powell, sitting by designation) argued that confusion was likely, and
that the trademark owner's rights were not outweighed by the expressive con-
tent of the shirt, because there was insufficient parodic content to counteract the
likelihood of confusion:
In this instance, the "parody" does little to prevent consumer confusion as to the
sponsor of defendants' T-shirt. It does not ridicule Budweiser or offer social com-
mentary on the evils of alcohol. Nor could it be deemed "so obvious and heavy
handed that a clear distinction was preserved in the viewer's mind between the
source of the actual product and the source of the parody."
222
In contrast, the dissent noted, if the shirt bore a message that was a true
parody in the "editorial or artistic" sense, as in the L.L. Bean and Cliff's Notes
case, this would warrant a higher degree of First Amendment protection:
Such would be the case, for instance, if Mothers Against Drunk Driving marketed T-
shirts bearing a caricature of the Budweiser trademark. (In that context, incidentally,
consumers would purchase the T-shirts precisely because they were not affiliated
with Anheuser-Busch. That is not true here.) I would conclude that defendants'
commercial speech, whose avowed aim was to convey "how great Myrtle Beach is,"
is not protected by the First Amendment from enforcement of the Lanham Act. All
that it does is play on the words of the Budweiser label, adopting a theme (the beach)
and a method (humor) that is fully consistent with Anheuser-Busch's marketing
efforts. Moreover, since the attempted parody does not dissociate defendants' T-shirt
from Anheuser-Busch's products, consumers will be just as likely to buy the T-shirt
because of its continuing affiliation with Anheuser-Busch as because of its humor.
That danger is particularly acute here since Anheuser-Busch and defendants compete
in the same market. The parody here thus amounts to nothing more than a "merchan-
dising short-cut."
223
Ironically, if the t-shirts had in fact ridiculed Budweiser or criticized its
product as unhealthful, thus avoiding (under Justice Powell's approach) any
likelihood of confusion, they would have been highly vulnerable to tarnish-
ment-based dilution claims in the majority of states, meeting the same fate as
Snicker Magazine's "Michelob Oily" parody in the Balducci case.
The application of state antidilution statutes to expressive merchandise
such as posters and T-shirts is particularly troubling because merchandise of
this nature often conveys expression that is subversive, unpopular, irreverent,
or controversial, and thus is particularly deserving of protection against institu-
tions with a vested interest in protecting the status quo, such as the large corpo-
rations which control some of the strongest trademarks in the world. 22 4 Courts
221 962 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1992).
222 Id. at 327.
223 Id. at 327 & n.8 (citations omitted).
224 Some courts have recognized posters as a form of expression which may be constitution-
ally protected. See Girl Scouts of America v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp.
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addressing dilution claims arising from expressive merchandise have given
insufficient consideration to the dual nature of this merchandise:
The classic example of commercial speech is an advertisement that "does no more
than propose a commercial transaction." On the other end of the spectrum lies purely
artistic speech. Between advertisement and art, there exist[ ] various forms of speech
that combine commercial and noncommercial elements. Whether a communication
combining those elements is to be treated as commercial speech depends on factors
such as whether the communication is an advertisement, whether the communication
makes reference to a specific product, and whether the speaker has an economic
motivation for the communication.
225
The application of the FTDA's noncommercial use exception to expres-
sive merchandise has yet to be tested. However, in light of the case law which
has applied the exception to speech which does more than simply propose a
commercial transaction, there is reason to be optimistic that expressive mer-
chandise will receive at least some protection under the federal statute, in con-
trast to the almost non-existent protection for such merchandise under state
antidilution statutes. Because most courts have been unwilling to apply general
First Amendment principles to dilution claims against expressive merchandise,
however, even favorable treatment for such merchandise under the FTDA is
likely to be ineffective as long as trademark owners have the option of proceed-
ing under state law.
D. Conclusion on Expressive Content
Because antidilution laws allow liability to be imposed even in the
absence of any likelihood of consumer confusion, they pose a much greater
threat to free expression, free competition, and the public domain than do the
traditional confusion-based infringement laws. As a result, courts should give
significant weight to First Amendment considerations whenever a dilution
claim involves an element of protected speech such as parody, criticism, or
commentary. Unfortunately, in applying state antidilution laws, the courts have
failed to demonstrate much sensitivity to these considerations. In contrast, the
FTDA's express exemption for noncommercial uses has provided significantly
better protection for First Amendment concerns, and should be given preemp-
tive effect in order to prevent trademark owners from curtailing expressive
speech by relying on more plaintiff-friendly state antidilution laws.
IV. DILUTION LAWS AS A THREAT TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
Without national uniformity, it will be difficult to establish and enforce
clear boundaries on the scope of dilution laws. Not only will this uncertainty
chill free expression, but it also threatens to erode the boundaries between
trademark laws, on the one hand, and the federal patent and copyright laws, on
the other. The exclusive rights conveyed by the federal copyright and patent
regimes are subject to significant limitations that are designed to preserve a
1228, 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc.2d 444, 299
N.Y.S.2d 501, 5098 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
225 World Champ. Wrestling v. Titan Sports, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 118, 122 (D. Conn. 1999)
(quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1993)).
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robust public domain. Blurring the boundaries between these doctrines and
trademark law will, in some cases, allow trademark owners an end-run around
the limitations of patent and copyright law, leading to an erosion of the public
domain.
A. Blurring Trademark and Copyright Law
In the case of copyright laws, preemption doctrine forecloses states from
enforcing laws which provide protections equivalent to federal copyright law,
or which upset the balance struck by federal copyright law between the rights
of the copyright owner and the rights of the public. Thus, state laws providing
rights equivalent to, or broader than, federal copyright law are preempted," 6 as
are state laws which impermissibly interfere with the operation of federal copy-
right law.227
Traditional trademark infringement laws ordinarily do not run afoul of
these restrictions on state power, because they impose the additional require-
ments of distinctiveness and likelihood of confusion. Dilution doctrine, how-
ever, eliminates the latter requirement.
In certain contexts, dilution laws have the potential to impermissibly inter-
fere with the federal copyright scheme. For example, while the fair use doc-
trine of federal copyright law might permit parodists, under appropriate
circumstances, to copy Disney characters for purposes of criticism or commen-
tary, state laws might impose liability for dilution in the same circumstances,
because the Disney characters are protected by both trademark and copyright
law. Similarly, while copyright law protects these characters only for limited
term specified by statute, under trademark law the protection for those charac-
ters will endure for so long as they continue to serve as origin identifiers for
Disney.
Although, as a federal statute, the Lanham Act is not preempted by federal
copyright law, the Supreme Court has recently expressed concern that too-lib-
eral application of federal trademark laws may impermissibly interfere with the
balance struck by federal copyright laws. In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp. ,228 the Court overruled a series of federal court precedents
which had permitted authors to assert section 43(a) claims against parties that
copied their works without attribution; 229 after Dastar, an author's sole
recourse in such a case is a suit under federal copyright law. Once the copy-
right in such a work has expired, the Court held, section 43(a) cannot be used to
achieve a de facto extension of the copyright term.
Because Dastar involved a section 43(a) claim, the plaintiff would have
had to show a likelihood of confusion in order to prevail. Yet the Court's
refusal to permit that claim to proceed implies that even a likelihood of confu-
sion requirement is not sufficient, in its view, to prevent misattribution claims
under section 43(a) from unduly interfering with the federal copyright scheme.
226 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
227 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
228 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
229 E.g., Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Dastar, however, involved a "reverse" application of trademark law, in
which a plaintiff objects to removal of its distinctive trademark (in this case,
the author's name). This is the opposite of a more traditional trademark claim,
in which a plaintiff objects to the unauthorized placement of its trademark on
another party's goods. Federal courts of appeal have recognized section 43(a)
as a viable remedy for persons who are falsely identified as the authors of
works which they did not create, 230 and the Supreme Court has yet to rule on
this line of precedents.
By eliminating the likelihood of confusion requirement, and retaining only
the distinctiveness requirement (sometimes enhanced by a fame requirement),
dilution doctrine eliminates one of the key differences between copyright pro-
tection and trademark protection. It is true, of course, that those differences
have already been diminished by other events-such as Congress's decision to
lengthen the term of copyright protection. But other significant differences
remain-such as copyright's requirement of originality (clearly distinguished
in The Trade-Mark Cases231 from the absence of such a requirement for trade-
marks), and the limitation of copyright protection to "works of authorship"-a
term which generally excludes words, short phrases, and names. Thus, many
types of expression can be trademarked but not copyrighted.
With respect to free expression, one of the greatest differences between
trademark and copyright protection is the concept of fair use in copyright
law.23 2 In addition to the many specific exceptions to the exclusive rights of
copyright owners that are provided in federal copyright law,2 33 fair use pro-
vides a particularly flexible "rule of reason" analysis, which permits almost any
unauthorized use of copyrighted materials if the use is of a type that a hypothet-
ical "reasonable copyright owner" should permit. In addition, fair use protects
certain unauthorized uses that merit protection under the First Amendment,
even if those uses (such as a parody or a quotation for the purpose of scathing
criticism) might offend a reasonable copyright owner.2 34
Although the First Amendment necessarily imposes limits on the enforce-
ment of antidilution, statutes, the scope of those limits is not clear, and has
proved problematic for the courts. Unlike the fair use provisions of federal
copyright law, most state antidilution statutes do not include specific standards
for distinguishing dilutive uses from protected speech. The FTDA does contain
such a standard-the noncommercial use exception-and while its scope mer-
its further clarification from Congress and the courts, if it is given preemptive
effect over state laws it will go a long way toward preventing copyright owners
from using the dilution doctrine as an end-run around the fair use doctrine.
230 See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); King
v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1992).
231 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
232 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
233 17 U.S.C. §§ 108-122 (2000).
234 Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). See generally JESSICA LIT-
MAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 84 (2001).
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B. Blurring Trademark and Patent Law
Dilution law also threatens to blur the distinction between trademark law
and the law of design patents. A design patent provides exclusive rights in
ornamental designs for articles of manufacture 23 5 if the designs are nonfunc-
tional, novel, and nonobvious. 36 Trademark law also protects nonfunctional
aspects of product design or packaging (both of which constitute trade dress),
regardless of originality, but only when they serve as indications of a product's
origin. Thus, the same design may be protected under both trademark law and
a design patent. However, design patent protection lasts for only fourteen
years,23 7 while trade dress protection endures for as long as the trade dress
continues to serve as an indication of origin.
However, the standards for obtaining and enforcing a design patent are
different from the standards for obtaining trade dress protection, and one of
these doctrines should not permit an end-run around the other. Thus, for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court in the Sears238 and Compco2 3 9 preemption cases made
clear that state laws protecting trade dress cannot be used to provide the
equivalent of design patent protection. If the state law in question requires a
plaintiff to establish that the trade dress is distinctive and that the defendant's
copying of that trade dress gives rise to a likelihood of confusion, the state law
will not be preempted because it does not provide a substitute for design patent
protection. The same general principle applies when a party seeks to enforce
its unregistered trade dress under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, or sues a
copyist under section 32 of the Lanham Act for infringing its federally regis-
tered trade dress-in either case, the copyist is liable only if the plaintiff s trade
dress is distinctive (as well as nonfunctional) and the copying is likely to lead
to consumer confusion as to source or sponsorship.2 4 ° In contrast, under the
law of design patents, copying is actionable even if the design is not distinctive,
and even if the copying is not likely to confuse consumers as to source or
sponsorship.
Thus, in the absence of dilution law, state or federal laws protecting trade
dress cannot substitute for design patent protection, because they offer no pro-
tection against copying that creates no likelihood of confusion as to source or
sponsorship. But the dilution doctrine changes this calculus. Under state
antidilution statutes as well as the FTDA, the owner of registered or unregis-
tered trade dress can prevail against a copyist even if the copying creates no
likelihood of consumer confusion. The asserted trade dress must still be dis-
tinctive, however, and in some cases famous; thus, federal and state antidilution
statutes do not offer a complete end-run around the law of design patents.
235 The term "articles of manufacture" refers to virtually any manufactured goods, including
such commodities as cutlery, shoes, mattresses, storage containers, lamps, and so forth. See,
e.g., In re Hruby, 373 F.2d 997 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
236 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000).
237 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2000).
238 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
239 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
240 See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995); Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
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Is the requirement of distinctiveness (or fame) enough of a difference to
prevent dilution law from serving as an end-run around the law of design pat-
ents? Consider an ornamental design that is protected by a design patent for
fourteen years. During this period, the design is unique, because any attempt to
copy it would be actionable, but it may not be distinctive, because consumers
may perceive it simply as an ornamentation rather than as an indication of
origin. At the expiration of the patent term, however, there is a strong possibil-
ity that this period of uniqueness will have caused the design to become distinc-
tive-that is, to be perceived by consumers as an indication of origin-and
possibly even famous. Thus, the fourteen year monopoly enjoyed under design
patent law could, under dilution law, be bootstrapped into protection of poten-
tially infinite duration under the law of trade dress. In the absence of antidilu-
tion statutes, trade dress protection would be available only to the extent
necessary to avoid confusing consumers. Under an antidilution statute, how-
ever, if the trade dress has become sufficiently distinctive, others will be barred
from using that design-or even a similar one-long after the patent has
expired, even in the absence of any likelihood of confusion.
Thus, dilution laws must be narrowly constrained in order to prevent trade
dress protection from upsetting the balance struck by Congress when it enacted
the laws protecting design patents. Although ad hoc litigation could eventually
develop workable standards for federal patent preemption of state dilution laws
as applied to trade dress, a more effective and efficient solution would be to
impose a uniform federal standard for dilution protection of trade dress.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the FTDA has no general preemption provision, it does provide
that federal trademark registration on the Principal Register is a complete
defense to liability under state dilution laws. 241 Thus, the FTDA already con-
tains a partial preemption provision. This Article proposes expanding the pre-
emptive effect of the FTDA in order to provide greater certainty and
nationwide uniformity regarding the scope of a trademark owner's right to pro-
tection against dilutive but non-confusing uses.
Efforts to fine-tune the FTDA in order to clarify the scope of dilution law
and to protect noncommercial uses, while well-intended, will have little effect
if plaintiffs that are unable to meet the more stringent federal requirements can
simply turn to state dilution laws for relief. Accordingly, the only way to
ensure that dilution laws do not inappropriately chill competition and free
expression, or impermissibly encroach upon the public domain, is to give the
FTDA preemptive effect over all state laws protecting trademarks against non-
confusing uses.
Concerns similar to those raised in this Article have been voiced in the
analogous context of the right of publicity, which recognizes a celebrity's right
to prevent unauthorized commercial appropriation of his or her name or like-
ness. Like the dilution doctrine, the right of publicity does not depend on
whether the unauthorized use gives rise to a likelihood of confusion.
242
241 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2000).
242 See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 960 (6th Cir. 2003).
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Instead, it treats a famous person's identity as property, just as dilution law
treats a famous trademark as property. In Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass'n,2 4 3 a federal district court held that commercial parodies are pro-
tected by the First Amendment against claims arising under a state law right of
publicity. If this were not so, the court warned:
The propagation of parody would become entirely contingent on receiving permis-
sion from the subject. Such a result would be contrary to the purposes of the right of
publicity and the First Amendment .... Were the statute exploited to its full poten-
tial, the art of parody, in a commercial context, would cease to exist.2 4 4
The court endorsed the views of scholar Michael Madow, whose words
seem equally pertinent to antidilution laws:
[T]he power to license is the power to suppress. When the law gives a celebrity a
right of publicity, it does more than funnel additional income her way. It gives her
(or her assignee) a substantial measure of power over the production and circulation
of meaning and identity in our society: power, if she so chooses, to suppress readings
or appropriations of her persona that depart from, challenge, or subvert the meaning
she prefers; power to deny to others the use of her persona in the construction and
communication of alternative or oppositional identities and social relations; power,
ultimately, to limit the expressive and communicative opportunities of the rest of
us.245
The Tenth Circuit's affirmance in Cardtoons noted that even though the
defendant's parodies took the form of trading cards, rather than more traditional
forms of expression, and were sold for profit, they were not commercial
speech, because they did much more than propose a commercial transaction.
As social commentary, they were protected by the First Amendment. 246
Unfortunately, courts interpreting state antidilution statutes have not con-
sistently displayed such sensitivity to First Amendment concerns. One of the
greatest benefits of giving preemptive status to the FTDA would be to bring
these concerns to the forefront of every dilution case by requiring the litigants
and the courts to consider the impact of the noncommercial use exception. If
the evolving case law so warrants, Congress can clarify or fine-tune the excep-
tion as needed. Like the fair use defense in copyright law, the noncommercial
use exception can be the first line of defense for free expression that is
threatened by dilution law.
243 868 F. Supp. 1266 (N.D. Okla. 1994), affd, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
244 Id. at 1275.
245 Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 125, 145-46 (1993).
246 95 F.3d 959, 968-70 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976)); Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486
U.S. 750, 756 n.5 (1988)).
